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## **Report on Economic and Social Conditions in West Africa in 2010 and Outlook for 2011**

### **A Decade of the Implementation of MDGs: Achievements and Shortfalls**

**January 2012**



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*“The world in the XXI century will not be stable or prosperous as long as the problems of Africa are not resolved”.*

J. Koizimu, PM Japan, 2003



## Acronyms and abbreviations

ACP	African Caribbean and Pacific (States)
ADB	African Development Bank
AEO	African Economic Outlook
AFD	Aide Française au Développement (French Development Agency)
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
BCEAO	Banque Centrale des Etats d’Afrique de l’Ouest (Central Bank of West African States)
BCS	Budget Consumption Survey
BEAC	Banque des Etats d’Afrique Centrale (Bank of Central African States)
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CET	Common External Tariff
CILSS	Comité permanent inter-états de lutte contre la sécheresse dans le Sahel (Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel)
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon dioxide
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDSM	Enquête Démographique et de Santé au Mali (Mali Demographic and Health Survey)
EMCES	Enquête Malienne de Conjoncture Economique et Sociale (Malian Economic and Social Survey)
EMEP	Enquête Malienne d’Evaluation de la Pauvreté (Malian Poverty Evaluation Survey)
EU	European Union
EU-ACP	European Union African Caribbean and Pacific (States)
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FCFA	Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community Franc)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFAF	Gross Fixed Asset Formation
GMW	Guaranteed Minimum Wage
GSER	Gross School Enrolment Rate
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
<i>HIV</i>	<i>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</i>
HPI	Human Poverty Index
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
HDI	Human Development Index (Index du Développement Humain – IDH)

IFRI	Institut Français des Relations Internationales (French International Relations Institute)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITU:	International Telecommunications Union
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NISD	National Institute of Statistics and Demography
NTIC	New Technologies for Information and Communication
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODP	Ozone Depletion Potential
PAD	Public Aid to Development
PRSF	Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RUP	Restructuring and Upgrading Programme
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UEMOA	Union Economique Monétaire Ouest Africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union - WAEMU)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSD	United Nations Statistics Division
USD	United States Dollars
UNO	United Nations Organization
WACIP	West African Common Industrial Policy
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone
WB	The World Bank Group
WHO	World Health Organization

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## Foreword

As part of the overall mandate of the Economic Commission for Africa towards shaping socio-economic development policies in Africa, the Sub-Regional Office for West Africa undertakes an annual review of the economic and social conditions in West Africa. Through the expert analysis of macro-economic and social indicators provided in this report, member States are able to undertake cross-country comparisons and draw conclusions to help overcome development challenges at both national and sub-regional levels. The annual analysis of economic and social conditions provides the fifteen member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with a source of information indicating trends in the evolution of the socio-economic indicators over time and also juxtaposes these experiences with the pertinent international developments to develop specific recommendations for the sub region. An in-depth review of a specific development theme selected for that year accompanies the annual economic analysis.

The theme of this *Report on Economic and Social Conditions in West Africa for 2011* is on the assessment of progress and prospects towards the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in West Africa. The assessment of progress towards the achievement of MDGs is particularly important given that 2015 is only a few years away. Such an analysis provides an ideal opportunity for West Africa to take stock of progress and prospects in order to craft well-informed strategies to accelerate progress. Ten years into the MDG commitments, different member States have faced challenges in certain areas and enjoyed success in others. This comparative review provides a platform for cross-country comparisons, benchmarking and learning experiences.

This inaugural Edition of the Joint Report on Economic and Social Conditions in West Africa is the outcome of the collaborative efforts of the ECOWAS Commission and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Sub-regional office for West Africa (UNECA SRO-WA) under the multi-year programme between the two institutions. The multi-year programme signed in 2007 between our two institutions has seen strengthened collaboration in addressing the development challenges faced by our sub-region. The national and sub-regional recommendations in this publication are expected to shape and guide socio-economic policy development and implementation to enable West African countries to reduce poverty, promote inter- and intra-regional trade, strengthen regional integration, fight disease and malnutrition, reduce gender inequality and accelerate progress towards the MDGs.

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## Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) economies remain vulnerable and the sustainability of relatively strong growth rates is uncertain given the intensifying fiscal woes in the United States of America, Europe and Japan. During the 2007 and 2008 economic crises, the SSA countries were able to use their heightened economy activity led by booming primary sector (minerals and oil), and improved political and economic governance to consolidate their fiscal positions by reducing deficits and debts to sustainable levels. The countries introduced economic reforms and new progressive economic policies, and ushered in an economic environment that received the positive support of development partners who responded on selective basis by increasing aid flows and introducing debt relief. These measures further spurred economy activity. However, the food and energy price shocks which preceded the global financial crisis weakened the external position of net importers of these commodities, fuelled inflation, and hampered the economies' growth potential. They also made more difficult the dual task of further consolidating macroeconomic gains, on the one hand, and increasing social spending to fight poverty, on the other.

The SSA region with a population of slightly more than 840 million inhabitants in 2009 spread across 47 countries faces immense development challenges. For example, unlike other regions, the number of people living below the poverty line continues to increase, while thousands, mostly children, die daily from avoidable or controllable diseases, and AIDS and malaria continue to ravage the region. The situation in West Africa mirrors the conditions in the rest of SSA plagued by high levels poverty, youth unemployment rates, infant mortality and malnutrition in most countries. West Africa extends from the coastal countries lying north of the Gulf of Guinea to Senegal, and includes the Sahelian hinterland. The fifteen member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. ECOWAS presents the widest linguistic and geographical diversity, as well as the richest variety of natural resources when compared with other sub-regions of the continent. In 2008, the population of the fifteen ECOWAS member States totaled 281½ million inhabitants, with 52% of the sub-region's population living in Nigeria. The population presents a human resource base which the sub-region should utilize for socio-economic development.

The economic, social and environmental situation of West Africa, like the rest of SSA, reflects a vulnerable, externally oriented sub-region, which is highly dependent on social and economic developments in the outside world. Consequently its highly externalized economy maintains a trade structure which is conditioned by its dependence on the export of raw materials for foreign exchange earnings. This means that the countries of the sub-region are still highly vulnerable to the exigencies of

external factors such as the swings in the price of raw materials, climate hazards and restricted access to the industrialized nations' markets.

In the last few years, the West African countries, under the combined effects of strong global demand for raw materials and domestic reform measures, have enjoyed sustained economic growth rates. However, these rates have remained below the 7% threshold needed for effective poverty reduction within the framework of the MDGs. A protracted weak international demand for raw materials and a severe drop in their prices, the drying up of foreign direct investment and aid flows, and the reduction in remittances from nationals in the diaspora during the financial crisis, have begun to make their effects felt. The dynamics created by these factors reduced the average growth rate to 3.2% per annum for West Africa in 2009. It rebounded to 5.6% in 2010 against an average of 5.5% for the five previous years (UNECA, 2012). These growth rates will have positive social impacts and may support the countries' efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The crises did, however, serve to highlight one of the paradoxes of development in the sub-region. Despite the vast expanses of land and abundance of water, the region continues to depend on the outside world for its food requirements due a combination of structural constraints and weather-induced challenges. The agricultural sector provides a source of livelihood to two-thirds of the sub-region's population and contributes half the exports of most countries. It makes up nearly 25% of regional gross domestic product (GDP), and provides more than 60% of jobs. Therefore, the sector needs to be central to both national and sub-regional development strategies.

West Africa continues to experience serious difficulties in achieving sustainable growth and harmonious development due a multitude of structural constraints. The high levels of poverty represent a major obstacle to the region's development together with the high level of unemployment, especially amongst the youth. An estimated 62% of the inhabitants of the ECOWAS sub-region are poor. Consequently, the fight against poverty is a priority for the stability and development of the sub-region. The actions envisaged by the international community to reduce poverty are encapsulated in the MDGs which countries agreed should be achieved by 2015. The Millennium Development Goals Declaration signed in September 2000 identified the eight goals. The goals seek to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality rate; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. In all instances, interventions in the areas of reproductive health and rights, women's empowerment and population issues is central to MDG achievement, particularly with regard to the promotion of gender equality, the improvement of maternal health and prevention of *Human immunodeficiency virus* (HIV). The commitment of the

member States to the attainment of MDGs is unshakable. However, the prospects of attaining the MDGs could be undermined by the impact of both endogenous and exogenous factors, and by the fact that the West African countries are faced with many global challenges.

Youth unemployment and underemployment remain one of the major social concerns of West Africa. Using the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition of unemployment, an estimated 15-20% of the youth in the sub-region can be classified as unemployed (ILO, 2009). However, using the expanded definition of unemployment taking into account decent jobs, the youth unemployment rate in West Africa is estimated at about 45%. The level of unemployment continues to rise due to many factors including the decline in productivity, and poor support to the primary sectors where the majority of the population is concentrated. The poor activity in the agricultural sector in particular is accelerating the rural to urban migration by the youth. When considered in conjunction with the fledgling state of the industrial sector and its poor labor absorption capacity, the trend away from the rural areas aggravates youth unemployment and underemployment in the urban areas. It also swells the informal sector of the West African economies, as a result of the torpor of the tertiary sector, and constitutes a refuge for the qualified youth and other vulnerable sections of the society in search of employment.

In the area of public finance, the West African countries do not, in general, generate sufficient income internally in order to finance national expenditure including expenditures needed for poverty reduction programmes. The situation was particularly exacerbated in 2008 as a result of the pressure exerted by the demands of the State on public finances in order to mitigate the impacts of rising food and energy prices. More pressure resulted from the challenges of political and economic governance which undermined the commendable efforts to consolidate peace in the recent past.

The long history of the exploitation of the vast mineral and energy resources in West Africa has failed to spur development. West African countries remain under-developed and poor. For example, countries such as Ghana and Mali have a long history of gold mining, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Guinea (rutile and diamonds), uranium in Niger, bauxite in Guinea and Sierra Leone, petroleum in Nigeria, iron ore in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Liberia, limestone in Benin, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the gypsum and zinc in Nigeria and Guinea. In addition, the sub-region is crisscrossed by numerous rivers, the largest of which are the Rivers Niger, Senegal, Gambia, and Lake Volta which could be harnessed for hydroelectric power to drive economic growth. West Africa also produces agricultural raw materials, a substantial part of which are sold on the international markets. The major agricultural products include cotton, grown mainly in Mali, Burkina Faso and Benin, rubber in Liberia, and cocoa and coffee in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.

This Publication presents the outcome of the review of the economic and social conditions in West Africa in 2010 taking into account international developments. It also presents an analysis of progress and prospects towards the attainment of MDGs in the sub-region. The publication is divided into two major parts.

Part I is a review of recent economic and social developments in West Africa. The analysis focuses on key international economic and social developments and reviews the economic and social performance of ECOWAS member States. This part consists of three thematic; the fourth Chapter is focused on trends, and concludes with an outlook for 2011 and recommendations to overcome some of the challenges.

Part II presents an evaluation of progress prospects in the implementation of programmes towards the attainment of MDG in West Africa. The analysis undertakes a detailed review of progress towards the eight MDGs, highlights success factors and identifies challenges. The analysis shows that, on the whole, West African countries have made reasonable progress towards achieving the MDGs. However, some of these advances have begun to stagnate and decline, following the global economic, energy and food crises. Yet there are reasons for optimism that progress will continue even at a slow pace due to the positive economic performance achieved by the sub-region since the early 2000s of about 5% over the period. Further, the commitment of African governments and of sub-regional and continental bodies to make every effort to achieve the MDGs will also be key factors. This part concludes with recommendations to accelerate progress towards the 2015 targets.



# PART I

## Recent Economic and Social Developments Trends in 2010 and Outlook for 2011

## Overview

In order to gain an understanding of the current challenges facing West Africa, appreciate the constraints that have contributed to the slowdown of its economic and social development, and conduct a valid assessment of its current socio-economic situation, it is imperative to make reference to, and analyse the prevailing international environment. Certain key development challenges come immediately to mind in this regard, such as the food crisis, the energy crisis and the recent financial and economic crisis which shook the entire world through its direct and indirect effects. Further, the development and consolidation of economic relations between Asia and China in particular with the African continent are all important dimensions which require critical review in crafting medium and longterm solutions to address the myriad of sub regional challenges. At a time when all attention is focused on the globalization of economies and issues arising from the financial upheaval in the developed countries and their knock-on effects on the rest of the world, the issue of the development outlook for Africa once more assumes a higher level of acuity. The review of socio-economic developments in West Africa in 2010 brings into perspective these developments and attempts to isolate both internal and external issues that should be of priority in seeking to propel the economies of the sub region onto a sustainable growth trajectory.

## Chapter 1

# International Economic Developments and their Implications for West Africa

It is indisputable that West Africa is an extremely fragile region needing diverse and concerted policy measures in order to jump start growth and development. Poverty in the region is a real scourge. Many experts put forward the theory that “a growth rate below 7% is not enough to reduce poverty”. The West African sub-region is very vulnerable from exogenous shocks which compound an already precarious situation. It is therefore of vital importance to address the issues of the food and energy crises, the recent global crisis, the breakthrough of the Asian giants, and of China in particular, and trade with the traditional trading partners, Europe, the United States and Japan, and other emerging markets, India, Brazil and Russia, which impact most significantly on the region.

### 1.1. The Food Crisis

Recent data published by the World Bank Group (April 2011) indicates that 44 million people living in developing countries plunged into poverty since June 2010 due to the rise in food prices which continued to rise to new heights in 2008. According to Robert B. Zoellick, the president of the World Bank Group, “*World food prices are reaching higher heights and pose a threat to tens of millions of families around the world. The price hike is already pushing millions of people into poverty and putting stress on the most vulnerable, who spend more than half of their income on food*”, he underscored. The 2011 February Newsletter edition of *Food Price Watch* indicates the World Bank’s food price index went up by 15% between October 2010 and January 2011. In that February month, it was at a level 29% higher than 2009, and was only 3% from its 2008 ceiling.

Amongst cereals, the price of wheat has increased most. It actually doubled between June 2010 and January 2011. Since the consumption of wheat-based bread is widespread in West African cities, the rise in its price has serious implications on food security in the sub region. The price of maize on its part surged 73 % but the price of rice witnessed a slower increase than that of other cereals – a staple for a large number of poor people. The prices of sugar and edible oils also shot up, and other foodstuffs that are essential to ensuring a varied diet followed the same trend. This was the case with beans in some African countries.

According to *Food Price Watch, February 2011*(p.5), the increase in the number of people that this explosion in prices plunged into extreme poverty (defined as living on less than 1.25 dollars per day) is linked to a rise in malnutrition, because the poor

eat less and are forced to buy foods that are cheaper, but less nutritious. Hunger and malnutrition have established a stronghold in West Africa as a result of the acute food crisis between 2005-2011, which is itself the result of the failings in the functioning of the agricultural sector and in the policies underpinning it. Grain production, land productivity and yield, as well as agricultural policy all have to be called into question. The causes of the food crisis in West Africa are multiple, and encompass natural, political and economic issues.

The recurrent food crises are in reality indicative of an essentially political problem, compounded by drought and adverse natural conditions. In many instances, the actions carried out in favor of the rural population are insufficiently far-reaching, and therefore unable to make an adequate contribution to the agricultural development of the sub-region. In addition, the effects of climate change limit the productive capacity of agricultural land. Drought and locust invasion are a recurrent phenomenon in West Africa, with consequences which pose a serious threat to the means of existence and access to food for millions of rural dwellers and livestock farmers.

The increase in food prices further exacerbates the food crisis, particularly in Mali and Niger, where floods have reduced output and thus plunged millions into starvation. According to Fernanda Guerrieri, the head of FAO's emergency operations, "The situation is getting worse in the affected areas, and unless aid arrives now, hundreds of thousands of people will be suffering from the consequences for years to come. Farmers and herders that lost their livelihoods due to drought and the invasion of desert locust are enduring poverty and low access to food". Millions of people are still suffering the effects of famine and malnutrition in West Africa, particularly in Niger, northern Burkina Faso and northern Nigeria (see Table 1). Experts say the crisis promises to be very serious, in particular because of flooding that hit many countries and poor harvests that have become the rule.

Table 1: Relevant figures of malnutrition in the Sahel, 2010

Country	% of population malnourished	% of children under five years of age suffering from chronic malnutrition or stunting
Burkina Faso	10%	35%
Mali	11%	38%
Mauritania	8%	35%
Niger	29%	50%
Nigeria	9%	38%
Senegal	26%	16%
Tchad	39%	41%

Source: WFP & UNICEF, 2010

In the most severely affected areas of Mali and Niger, access to staple foodstuffs is increasingly difficult, and cases of severe infant malnutrition are on the increase.

Water and fodder scarcity seriously affect the health of cattle, camels, sheep and goats, which are the only source of food and income for the nomadic communities. Competition for the limited resources sometimes degenerates into local conflict.

Most West African countries faced serious food insecurity due to the rarity of rainfall and poor harvests in 2010 with Niger and Mali being the hardest hit. The impacts were also felt in the northern parts of Nigeria and in Burkina Faso.

As always, the women were the hardest hit by this emergency situation. In Niger, it is the women who are responsible for implementation of household adaptation strategies to help cope with food crises. For example, they are responsible for rationing meals or for gathering leaves and wild fruit to eke out the food for the family. When even this is not enough, the small livestock, which represent the savings of these women, are sold off in order to pay for food.

“Cattle breeders are gradually and irreversibly sinking into abject poverty”. This is what emerges from the open letter sent by West Africa cattle breeders to the Heads of State of the Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) during the 25th annual meeting of the Food Crisis Prevention Network, which was held in Bamako at the start of December 2009. Cattle breeder and herder communities are already hard hit and recognized as the most vulnerable with a sharp projected malnutrition rate of 29.9%, double the emergency level set at 15%.

The food shortages caused by low rainfall and other factors triggered a rise in the prices of basic foodstuffs which has further complicated the lives of millions of West Africans already living in poverty.

## 1.2. The Energy Crisis

Insufficient power is an impediment to economic and social growth and development. Yet West Africa has, in the last few years up till 2010, experienced an increasingly severe energy crisis. As a matter of fact, Africa currently presents an energy paradox: whereas it possesses a vast store of energy sources (e.g. petroleum, natural gas, solar, and wind) it consumes very little energy, and what it does consume is sourced traditionally from the biomass. The energy situation in most West African countries reveals a very strong dependence on traditional biomass, with firewood, charcoal, and crop residue representing more than 75% of primary energy consumption. In fact, apart from Nigeria, with its huge reserves of petroleum and gas, and Côte d'Ivoire with its offshore reserves, the other countries of the region are significantly dependent on fuel wood for energy. The importance of petroleum consumption in these economies can best be illustrated by a comparison of the level of national petroleum consumption per unit of GDP for each country (*France-Inflation.com, 2011*). According to this

indicator, West African countries consume on average 30% more petroleum than any European country.


Even assuming that GDP is undervalued, due to the huge informal economy, or that petroleum consumption is overestimated, the global trend remains unchanged. There are a number of explanations for the relatively high petroleum consumption level: the weight of trade in GDP, the geographical situation of the country (wide expanses of not easily accessible territory); the near total non-existence of alternatives to road transport, and the relatively important role of petroleum in electricity generation (thermal power stations or privately owned individual diesel generators). With 50% of fuel consumption being absorbed by the transport sector, and the share of trade in the economy, increases in the price of fuel impact on most economic sectors.

Such a heavy dependence on petroleum not only renders economies vulnerable to price increases, but also influences the policies designed to mitigate the effects of these increases. In the industrialized world, increases in fuel prices induce, even in the short term, a drop in consumption through reduced demand or the implementation of alternatives. In West Africa, the absence of alternatives, and the weight of fuel consumption in the production sectors limit the possibilities for short-term adjustment. Policies should therefore focus on medium to long-term consumption and cost reduction, by offering alternatives to road transport (rail or river), lower import costs (infrastructures) and diversification of primary energy sources, particularly in electricity production. The spike in petroleum prices in the recent past (beginning 2009) has not made the economic situation of the already beleaguered West African countries any easier. For instance, the pump price of fuel in November 2010 peaked at its highest level since 2008. With the price of a barrel of petroleum exceeding the 85 US dollar mark, these fragile economies are in an even more invidious situation.

As a result of this growth in demand, the price of the petroleum has increased over time. In the last ten years, the average barrel price of petroleum has increased by 244%. Graph 2 shows the price of oil between 2001 and 2011 indicating a strengthening of the price since February 2009. Current political developments in the Gulf Region indicate that prices will remain stronger in 2011.

The increase in fuel prices has amplified the inflationary trend in West Africa as elsewhere, by accelerating the rise in the production costs of goods and services. Since petroleum is a strategic product without which our modern economies cannot function, and moreover, since increase engenders further increase, the trend will extend to the rest of the economy.

**Graph 2: Trend of petroleum barrel price (USD)** 1 day record



**Source:** France-Inflation.com (2011). Average monthly costs since 1970 (Petroleum price between 1970 and 2010), [http://www.france-inflation.com/graph\\_oil.php](http://www.france-inflation.com/graph_oil.php)

Rising petroleum prices have pushed the major consumer countries into finding substitutes, particularly in the form of bio-fuels. Some commentators argue that the growth of the bio-fuels sector could disrupt food production. In the long-run, this could worsen the food crisis in the West African countries. Grains and rice in particular, occupy an important place in the food consumption of the people of West Africa. A considerable amount of this rice is imported from Asia, which, in order to mitigate the effects of the global energy crisis, has reserved approximately 20% of land which was previously used to grow rice, for the cultivation of bio-fuels.

In order to improve the power output, Mali commissioned a new power station in October 2010, at a cost of 22 billion CFA francs. A second station, with a 69Mw capacity is scheduled to be built at Kayes (in the western, mineral-rich part of the country) at a cost of 35 billion CFA francs. The completion date, according to Government estimates, is 12 months. All these investments are aimed at strengthening and expanding the electricity network as a more effective means of achieving poverty reduction.

In Burkina Faso, load-shedding continues, especially now that the Burkinabé national electricity company (Sonabel) is working to extend the present electrification level from 20% to 60% by 2015. A number of projects are in the pipeline, including a 16Mw power generation unit which is being installed in the capital as an emergency measure to absorb the huge increase in demand. In addition, the on-going interconnection

project linking Bolgatanga (Ghana) to Ouagadougou will supply Burkina Faso with electricity from the Ghanaian national grid. Pending completion of these projects, most of the countries of the sub-region will continue to face enormous difficulties resulting from their inability to satisfy the demand for electricity, on an individual basis.

Côte d'Ivoire, which normally enjoys very stable electricity supply, experienced a 150Mw shortfall in power production at the beginning of 2010. This shortfall, which is the equivalent of 1/6 of total consumption, precipitated the country into a cycle of load-shedding. In Senegal, power outages were so frequent between July and September 2010 that they sparked off another wave of popular protest which came to be known as the "electricity riots" in Dakar and in provincial towns. The Beninese people were no better off.

In April 2010, the Beninese electricity company (SBEE Plc) resorted to increasing the cost of electricity in order to finance the 22.3 billion FCFA deficit, which threatened its very existence. The announcement was made at a time when the country was experiencing repeated power cuts despite official announcements referring to "production increases".

In each case, load-shedding seriously aggravated the already precarious situation of the households and enterprises of the region, plunging the public into near-permanent darkness, and destroying all efforts to mechanize certain manual activities. These challenges further underline the intricate relationship between access to energy and socio-economic development. Industrial output is adversely affected by these power outages and this further reduces the output from an already small domestic manufacturing sector.

### 1.3. The global economic and financial crisis

Although the implications of the financial and economic crises were indisputably less severe in the region than elsewhere due to the limited integration of the West African economy with international markets, it can nonetheless be considered a harmful and destabilizing phenomenon.

The international financial crisis which spread through the money and credit markets in the wake of an increase in unpaid arrears within the mortgage sub-sector of the United States of America sent shock waves across the entire planet. The crisis was initially financial, spreading to the economic sector. According to the IMF Report (*Global Economic Outlook*), global growth slowed by nearly 3.5% in 2008, to nearly 0.5% in 2009, and the risks of the outlook for the future maintain their downward trend. The economic slowdown tended to be rather pronounced in the West. A



slowdown was also observed in China, India, Brazil and other emerging economies, ranging from 6.25% in 2008 to about 3.5% in 2009, as a result of a fall in exports, the reduction in capital flows, and a drop in the prices of raw materials. Consequently, growth in all emerging and developing countries, including sub-Saharan Africa, fell to 6.3% in 2008 and to 3.5% in 2009, recovering gradually, in parallel with global demand in 2010.

During 2009 global GDP contracted by an estimated 1.7% for the first time since the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War. The crisis has now taken on a social dimension, as evidenced by rising unemployment in those countries which were ravaged by it. If strong counter-measures are not taken, it will also engender political consequences for the developing countries, and the African countries in particular, as they begin to feel the harmful effects of a drop in the demand for raw materials, and the depletion of external financing sources as a result of the general recession which appears to have taken hold in all the countries of the northern hemisphere.

All analyses of contemporary economic and financial issues are unanimous in acknowledging that the 2007/2008 crisis contributed a global slowdown in growth, insofar as it attacked all the basic tenets of the modern economic system as well as negative consequences at the sectoral levels. It is systemic in character, and likely to persist, in view of its intensity, its vectors for contagion, its scope, the ineffectiveness of the remedies being applied, and most importantly, its unpredictable and indescribable consequences for the real economy.

### 1.3.1. The Situation of Africa within the Context of the 2007/2008 Crisis

Many analysts contend that at a glance, Africa appears to be the continent which has been the least affected by the financial crisis, in view of its low level of integration into the economic and financial globalization situation. The crisis is mainly about the depletion of credit in favor of Western enterprises, which explains why, in practical terms, Africa should be less affected than other regions. The credit institutions operating in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) zone covering eight West African countries, for instance, are commercial banks which accumulate profits and cash by providing short-term credit facilities to the State to cover its imports of petroleum, foodstuffs, equipment and other consumer products. Their loans in favor of local enterprises constitute only a small percentage of their transactions, and loans in favor of individuals an even smaller percentage. It is not surprising therefore that most of these commercial banks should maintain cash surpluses. It is equally obvious that most banks in West Africa do not operate at the level of international high finance. Their shares are not quoted on the international stock exchange because the banks themselves are small units characterized by a relatively low volume

of transactions. In fact, they are basically banks which receive short-term deposits mainly from individuals, and mostly from salary-earners. This situation shelters them temporarily from the on-going international financial crisis.

Despite the general economic collapse, growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly in West Africa, attained the level of 6% in 2009. In corroboration of this fact, and according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing its best economic situation in 30 years. The entire continent has in fact demonstrated unexpected resilience: 6.1% in 2006, 6.3% in 2007, and 5.9% in 2008. This positive performance is attributable to the relatively high prices of raw materials (petroleum, minerals, wood, agricultural products) sustained by strong Asian demand, as well as improved governance and the absence of “toxic” financial products in the African financial system. The extent to which the different countries are able to benefit from increased prices of raw materials depends on the production of particular commodities and the development in the prices of those commodities. For example, Nigeria would benefit most from increases in petroleum prices, in bauxite and phosphate production (Guinea-Conakry), in gold and cotton production (Mali), in coffee and cocoa production (Côte d’Ivoire), and for gold and cocoa production, Ghana would benefit the most. However its isolation from international trade (2% of global trade) will be an advantage, because it will be spared the slump of economies that are very open, very speculative and thus very vulnerable.

It is clear that the financial crisis has not directly affected the countries of West Africa. However, they could suffer its induced effects by virtue of the fact that they maintain economic relations (trade, investments, aid) with the industrialized countries which bear the full brunt of the crisis. One way or another, Africa will be affected by the crisis.

### 1.3.2. Impacts and Induced Effects of the Crisis on Africa

In Africa, the crisis could have some unpredictable effects. It is likely to constitute a setback for the continuation of growth. This slowdown in growth can be attributed to the following factors; a decline in raw materials demand, reduction in export earnings and a slowdown in foreign direct investment inflows.

**A decline in the demand for the raw materials** for which the African continent is the main supplier. As already discussed, the economic growth and development of most sub-Saharan African countries is linked mainly to international trade, and specifically to their exports of raw materials (e.g. cotton, cocoa, coffee, sisal, skins and leather). Since the economies of the North are in recession, these exports will fall in value, with all the consequences which this could have on development in Africa, including a

decline in investments of domestic savings, shrinkage of State earnings and the spread of unemployment. This refers to the decline in investments from domestic savings, shrinkage of State revenues and the increase in unemployment.

**Reduction in export earnings:** Africa suffered a substantial loss of income in 2009. Between 2000 and 2009, the volatility in price growth made it impossible to plan the future of the continent based solely on the current trade structure. The growth rate of for petroleum products which had risen to 57% in 2000 and stood at 50.8% in 2008, collapsed to -6.3% in 2009 following the predictably strong contraction of the international demand for African products. Growth rate for food products over the same period rose from 2.5% to 29.8%, with a projected slump in 2009 to -5.8%. Finally, unprocessed raw materials followed the same descending curve, dropping from 5.5% in 2000 to 3.6% in 2008 and crashing to around -2.7 in 2009. Using previous food and energy crises in Africa as a reference point, this time, many Governments had to intervene in order to forestall hunger riots and social crisis, and to this end, allocate subsidies which cost between 0.2% and 0.6% in terms of growth, while increasing the budget deficit. One has only to refer to the current and fiscal balances of the African countries between 2008 and 2009 (inclusive of grants) in order to ascertain the strength or weakness of the African economies.

It can be argued that the financial crisis had only a limited effect on economies with substantial petroleum or non-petroleum resources, while its impact on those African economies with few resources was more severe. The assumption is therefore, that the crisis hit according to the structure of the economy, and according to the region of the continent under consideration. Based on the sub-Saharan average, those countries and regions without the capacity for wealth creation are also the ones whose economies and population were more extensively affected by the consequences of the financial crisis engendered by the wealthy countries as a result of their deregulation of the basic prudential regulations governing both mortgages and trust-based relations, as well as inter-bank lending.

In sub-Saharan Africa, it was observed that the global slowdown had brought down the prices of raw materials, with a resultant reduction of export earnings. Exporters of raw materials have suffered a net deterioration in terms of trade as a result. Cotton-exporting countries (e.g. Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali) already suffering the effects of stagnation caused by the subsidies paid to cotton farmers in the North, certainly suffered a further shock induced by the financial crisis. While the drop in price of raw materials is an advantage for possible buyers, for producer countries it has the reverse effect of placing them in a difficult situation because the product in question represents a valuable source of export income. This is a further factor militating against the outlook for growth in these countries in the coming months.

The erosion of investment capacity, reduction of imports of capital goods and, in some countries, of basic consumer goods lead to the depletion of the sources of external financing destined for Africa. For example, the social security deficit in France which was in the range of 10 billion Euros in 2008, doubled to 20 billion in 2009 as a result of the crisis. France, one of whose major concerns is to cover this deficit and reorganise its finances, and which in addition, intervenes financially in Africa on a large scale, will, as a result, cut back on its interventions. However, in the absence of sufficient budget aid, the problem of the survival and dependency of African States will arise.

**Contraction of foreign direct investment (FDI)** is the phenomenon which triggered a substantial decrease in industrial activity, without which there can be no sustained growth. Direct investment from a country abroad is the export of capital to another country for the purpose of acquiring or creating an enterprise, or again, of taking up shares in an enterprise (within the 10% threshold for voting power). The aim is to acquire an effective voice in the management of said enterprise.

The OECD defines FDI as “the activity through which a resident investor in a foreign economy establishes a lasting interest and a significant degree of influence in the management of a resident unit in another economy. This operation may involve the creation of an entirely new enterprise (investment, creation) or, more generally, the amendment of the statutes of ownership of existing enterprises (through mergers and acquisitions)”. In reality, because Northern enterprises are no longer capable of generating a sufficient profit level as a result of the crisis, they will limit the level of their investment abroad, and therefore, in Africa. This reversal of the trend in FDI could, in the most extreme cases, result in the closure of enterprises, with resultant lay-offs, thus contributing to the expansion of pockets of poverty.

It is a well-established fact that in sub-Saharan Africa, the slowdown in the world economy has resulted in a drop in the prices of raw materials, thereby bearing down on export earnings. Exporters of raw materials have suffered a net deterioration in terms of trade as a result.

The peculiar situation of West African countries in the CFA zone requires further analysis for several reasons.

Firstly, because of the freely convertible and transferable nature of their currency in Euro exclusively, the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc, these economies are as open as those of the Western world, and therefore, subject to speculative attacks on their currency. The fixed exchange rate of the CFA franc against the Euro makes it even more attractive to speculators who flood the banks of the zone with short-term speculative funds which are inappropriate to the financing of development projects requiring medium and long-term funding.

Secondly, although the income generated by the soaring prices of raw materials in the last few years has given a boost to the economies of the region, those countries which failed to use the opportunity to pay off their debts, diversify their economies towards the manufacture of substitute import products, invest in the improvement of their infrastructures and in development, will suffer the backlash of global recession.

Finally, at times of economic crisis, the safe investments most highly valued by investors and speculators are petroleum and precious metals such as gold and platinum. Demand for these commodities will continue to rise as the world sinks into depression. Conversely, the demand for other raw materials will fall as a result of the global slowdown, negatively impacting the economies of exporter countries. However, the gold-producing countries of West Africa could seize the opportunity to accumulate resources.

Measures to develop regional solidarity for the exploitation of Africa's resources within the framework of an expanded market in the global market should be developed and implemented. Globalisation holds out the prospects of both opportunity and risk for the African continent and Africa must be prepared to seize the opportunities and mitigate the risks.

## 1.4. The Asian Breakthrough: Focus on China

China is one of the leading economic players internationally. It is currently the world's second largest economy having overtaken Japan in 2011. One of the most remarkable aspects of the changes in the Chinese economy is its international openness. China was virtually operating as an autarky up to 1979 but has since opened up through a wave of reforms which began under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and under his watch phrase "Get rich!". Personal enrichment and consumerism backed by neo-Keynesian policies from 1997 have become the new economic credo. China began to play an increasingly significant role in trade relations from the end of the 1990s and its growth as a world power has continued. China has become the largest global low-cost production platform. It has also strongly imprinted its presence on the economies of sub-Saharan Africa which had, since the colonial era, been the preserve of the European countries. Some observers refer to China as the "world's factory" because it manufactures everything from cuddly toys, playthings, clothes, electronic alarm clocks to air conditioners. Considered to be "the largest workshop in the world", China manufactures nearly 30% of all the clothes sold worldwide.

The China-Africa summit held in Peking at the end of 2006 was an historic encounter which was attended by 48 African States. It enabled China to consolidate its trade links with the continent. In order to fuel growth, China needs the energy resources which Africa possesses in abundance. Africa also provides an outlet for cheap Chinese

manufactured exports. It is an established fact that Africa is a supplier of raw materials, while China's appetite for these products appears to have no limits, in addition to which it seems prepared to acquire these products at any cost, adopting an "upon payment" policy in order to gain access to natural resources. The Western world, which had promised two years previously to cancel the 35 billion dollar debt of the poorest countries, is resentful of the prospect of China investing massive amounts in the African continent, and granting loans on generous terms, with scant regard to the ability of the countries to repay or to the nature of the political regime in place.

In the specific domain of foreign direct investment in Africa, China had, by the middle of 2006, earmarked more than 1.5 billion USD for this purpose, and continues to increase the amount. In the area of aid to development, China has increased its investment levels in a number of African countries, especially in the recent past. Among other things, it has cancelled debt in favour of 31 African countries to the tune of 1.7 billion USD.

#### 1.4.1. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa


The sustained growth of the Chinese economy over the last few years has created enabling conditions for Chinese foreign investment. The Chinese Government encourages successful enterprises in the country to invest in Africa and develop local production. By the end of 2005, Chinese investment in Africa had reached the level of 6.27 billion USD. According to preliminary figures, direct Chinese investment in Africa stands at 370 billion USD in 2011. (Chinese Economic Office, Bamako, 2010, see Graph 3).

However, Chinese investment in West Africa outside of Nigeria, which is a petroleum-producing country, is still modest but continues to increase. The major objective of Chinese collaboration with Africa is first and foremost to secure supplies of raw materials and energy through a series of acquisitions, hence the increase in number of investments in the oil and minerals sectors. A further objective is the creation of home-grown champions by the Chinese State. This, in the case of certain enterprises, involves international exposure in order to counterbalance the effects of the massive opening up of China to foreign investment, which led to the take-over of control in entire swathes of its industries by foreign groups of companies.

The vast financial resources available to the Chinese enterprises explain in part the country's capacity to become a major player on the international scene. Between 2003 and 2005, Asia and Latin America appeared to be the main destinations for Chinese FDI. China is giving its Western competitors a run for their money in these markets. On its part, Africa is courted for its abundant raw materials. Accordingly, in Africa,

countries that receive Chinese FDI are those that are rich in energy resources such as Nigeria in West Africa.

**Graph 3: Chinese foreign direct investment**



**Source:** Chinese Economic Office, Bamako, 2010

#### 1.4.2. Analysis of Trade Relations between China and West Africa

China is now the leading trading power in Asia. It has replaced Japan as the leading market for Asian manufacturing industries and has almost caught up with it as supplier of the region's manufactured goods. With increased globalisation, China has assumed a leading role on the global trade scene and in 2010 became the second world trading nation after the United States. In 2010, it became the second global trading power after the United States. Its weight in global exports of finished goods rose from 1% in 1980 to 4% in 1993, and 9% in 2004.

At present, China is the biggest exporter of clothing in the world, with a share of the global market which is about 30%. It is also the second largest exporter of textiles, after the European Union (with a 15% share of the market). China is, among other things, a major player in the global supply and demand for new technology (information and communication technologies, or ICT) -allied products. In 2004, China was one of the leading producers and the leading exporter of new technology products, of which Mali has become a potential consumer.

China specialises in the production of cheap goods. An analysis of international trade in terms of price range (top-of-the-range, middle, cheap) reveals that in 2004 more than 70% of its exports classified as cheap products. The low cost of Chinese exports is attributable to the fact that they are mostly the least sophisticated type of product. Also, low production costs in China are reflected in lower prices than can be offered by competitors for goods of comparable quality (price competitiveness). Because there is predominance in West Africa, of the underprivileged and poor whose purchasing


power is limited, the demand for cheaper Chinese goods will obviously grow. It is true that China imports raw materials from Africa. However, the continent is above all an outlet for its cheap manufactured goods, especially textiles. Nonetheless, at times these very competitive products are in competition with African products, thus leading to job loss in the sectors concerned. It is against this background that we are witnessing a slowdown in activity in the textile industry in most countries in the region.

### 1.4.3. Chinese Aid to West Africa

China has substantially increased the amount of aid which it provides to Africa in many forms: technical assistance anchored on training in Chinese institutions, grants, interest-free loans, soft loans accompanied by interest rebates, and debt relief. However, China is not a member of the OECD Development Aid Committee which monitors the international aid granted to its members, nor has it yet made public the amount of aid granted, or the conditions attached to the aid.

The amounts involved in China's aid to Africa are substantial. Chinese cooperation in Africa is directed towards those countries with which China maintains economic or historic and special political relations (see Graph 3 below).

**Graph 3: Chinese cooperation towards selected African countries**



**Source:** Chinese Economic Office, Bamako, 2010

The residual value of an analysis of Chinese data provides only an approximate estimate of bilateral aid (without an evaluation of the benefit, it is impossible to determine whether it classifies as aid for development). DAC defines PAD as resources whose



*“main goal is to promote economic development and improve standard of living in the countries benefiting from such assistance”.*

The percentage of grants in the aid package is generally small, and on the part of the Western countries, much more project-specific. China, for its part, cancelled an estimated 260 million dollars worth of debt owed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal, Togo, Rwanda, Guinea and Uganda, four of which beneficiaries are in the West Africa region.

Chinese aid to West Africa, as previously indicated, contributes effectively to the improvement of the living conditions of the region's population, and to poverty reduction. This is all the more manifest in the fact that China intervenes on a massive scale in the essential social sectors (education, health) and in the construction of infrastructures underpinning the economic and social development of the countries concerned. Thus, China intervenes in favour of pro-poor growth, and contributes to institutional capacity building (and human capacity building. However, notwithstanding this involvement in economic and social development, and the fact that China prides itself on not attaching political conditions on its aid, the aid is conditional and serves particular interests.

The aid is conditional because the technology involved is imported from China and therefore imposed, thus guaranteeing the long-term dependency of West Africa. Moreover, in most cases, it is predominantly Chinese labour which is used in the construction of infrastructural projects. Part of the motivation behind these interventions is to provide a solution to the problem of Chinese unemployment. Chinese aid to the African countries is indeed generous, but also controversial. Laying claim to the win-win principle, China showers hundreds of millions of dollars on countries which, in exchange, like Nigeria, open up the gates to their natural resources.

The principal beneficiaries of China's largesse in Africa include, among others, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC), all which have an abundance of oil. From the viewpoint of specifics and stakes, Chinese aid is mostly granted in the form of loans, whereas DAC countries make grants. By causing the re-indebtedness of countries whose debt has been cancelled (under the HIPC initiative) China encourages a free-loading attitude, especially as it attaches no conditions to the loans.

Chinese loans for major investments, including infrastructure, are guaranteed against natural resources (oil, minerals). Its aid is directed mostly towards infrastructural, building and railroad construction projects, all of which contribute to gross fixed asset

formation (GFAF), represent productive capacity, and constitute powerful poverty reduction tools.

The economic penetration of China in Africa is multi-faceted. Chinese companies are doing very well as nearly 1,000 of them are operating in Africa. Their strength lies in their especially low prices, the offer of a range that is now wide, practices that are not always in line with market rules, thus giving them additional competitive advantage. Their objective is to consolidate their economic take-off by diversifying and securing their supplies of energy and raw materials. The Chinese onslaught is aimed at strengthening its diplomatic clout in Africa in order to establish its status as a superpower (African countries account for more than a third of members of the United Nations Organizations).

This review has shown that the economic outlook for West Africa has been adversely affected by the crises in food, energy and the economic and financial sectors. These factors have, either individually or collectively, rendered the region much more vulnerable to shocks.

It is in light of these findings that the economic performance and development of Africa will be reviewed.

## Chapter 2

### Economic Development Trends in West Africa

This chapter contains a presentation and description of necessary macroeconomic variables, and measures their progression, underscoring the manner in which they impact upon the overall mechanism of the economy.

#### 2.1. Macroeconomic Performance in West Africa

At the end of 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected a growth rate of 5.5% for West Africa. Recovery was expected in sub-Saharan African countries, most of which would record high growth rates, if the IMF trend was confirmed. Global IMF predictions for the region indicated a growth rate of 5% for 2010 and 5.5% for 2011. Table 2 below shows growth rate figures for the region, confirms the accuracy of this predicted trend. The 2011 figures should be considered as a very optimistic projections which need to be adjusted due to the consequences of the European Union fiscal and economic growth crises as well as major industrialized countries inability to maintain their trading level with West Africa's.

Table 2: 2001-2011 GDP Growth Rate Volumes in West Africa

Country/Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Benin	4.9	6.2	4.4	3.9	3.1	2.9	3.8	4.6	5.0	3.0	3.5	3.8
Burkina Faso	1.9	7.1	4.7	8.0	4.6	7.1	5.5	3.6	5.2	3.0	4.4	5.2
Cape Verde	7.3	6.1	5.3	4.7	4.3	6.5	10.8	7.8	5.9	3.9	5.1	6.4
Côte d'Ivoire	-3.7	0.0	-1.6	-1.7	1.6	1.8	0.7	1.6	2.3	3.6	3.9	4.5
The Gambia	5.5	5.8	-3.2	6.9	7.0	5.1	6.5	6.3	6.1	4.8	5.4	5.7
Ghana	3.7	4.2	4.5	5.2	5.6	5.9	6.4	6.3	7.0	4.7	6.4	8.3
Guinea	2.5	3.7	5.2	1.2	2.3	3.0	2.5	1.8	4.9	0.6	4.3	4.5
Guinea-Bissau	7.5	-0.6	-4.2	-0.6	2.2	3.5	0.6	2.7	3.3	2.9	3.4	4.0
Liberia	25.7	2.9	3.7	-31.	2.6	5.3	7.8	9.4	7.1	4.4	7.7	8.6
Mali	-3.1	11.9	4.3	7.6	2.3	6.1	5.3	4.3	5.0	4.4	4.6	5.3
Niger	-2.6	7.4	5.3	7.7	-0.8	7.2	5.8	3.4	9.5	-0.9	3.2	5.5
Nigeria	5.3	8.2	21.2	9.6	6.6	6.5	6.0	6.5	6.0	3.3	4.4	5.5
Senegal	3.2	4.6	0.7	6.7	5.9	5.6	2.3	4.7	2.5	1.5	3.4	4.3
Sierra Leone	3.8	18.2	27.4	9.5	7.4	7.3	7.4	6.4	3.9	35	4.0	5.0
Togo	-1.0	-1.3	-1.3	4.8	2.5	1.2	3.9	2.1	1.8	2.2	2.5	3.6

Source: World Bank (2010), World Bank, Washington D. C.

The overall growth rate trend in the region for the period under consideration was positive, except in Côte d'Ivoire which barely managed to reach 4%, and in Guinea Bissau. The situation in Togo was not particularly good, while in 2009, it was rather unfavourable in Guinea (0.6%), and Niger (0.9%). Unfortunately, on the whole, and despite positive trends, none of the West African countries except Liberia (7.7% in

2010), was able to reach the 7% threshold needed for poverty eradication. The main issue is therefore to determine whether this relatively favourable situation was able to drive development in terms of an improvement in the living conditions of the population. This second chapter addresses this issue.

A review of these developments shows that despite the recovery recorded in the economic growth rate of West Africa, poverty has not diminished for two reasons. Firstly, although 4% to 5% economic growth rates may appear high in comparison to the rates recorded elsewhere, they are below the suggested 7 % GDP growth by the MDGs to register any observable incidence on poverty, particularly in the face of strong demographic growth. Given that the average minimum annual growth rate needed to reduce poverty by half by 2015 is 7%, the rates currently recorded in West Africa are well below what they should be. Secondly, up till now, growth would appear to have been fuelled by capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive sectors of activity. In the last two years, especially, growth has, to a large extent, been driven by petroleum exports. This means that, with the exception of Nigeria, the West African countries are in no position to successfully combat poverty.

The detailed review of macroeconomic developments focuses on the direct and induced effects of; budget deficits, debt, employment and inflation.

### 2.1.1. Budget Deficits

The economic recovery referred to above should, in the African context, have swelled public income, at least in the petroleum-producing countries, which in West Africa, refers to Nigeria. Base budget deficit for Mali represents 1.4% of GDP, and, according to the IMF, economic growth would steady in 2010. GDP growth in 2009 was close to 4.5%, compared to the 2.8% rate recorded for UEMOA, and the 2.1% rate recorded for sub-Saharan Africa.

At sub-regional level, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire were the two countries most vulnerable to the international financial crisis. These two countries share the particularity of being the only ones to have signed the interim economic partnership agreements (IEPA) with Europe, and also the only ones in the region to have benefited from substantial foreign investment flows. With the support of BCEAO (the Central Bank of West African States), the UEMOA countries were able to cover their public deficit. According to the UEMOA quarterly outlook (2010) based on available data, the execution of the financial transactions of the States for the first quarter of 2010 resulted in a reduction of the public deficit through the implementation, with Central Bank support, of the programmes for liquidation of the arrears of payment recorded in 2009.

The outlook report goes on to state that “the 450 billion FCFA BCEAO grant backed by a special allocation of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR), dated 28 August 2009,

enabled the States to reorganise their public finances, focusing on improved tax revenue recovery and prudent and controlled management of current expenditure and investment in the so-called priority sectors". In addition, "the States of the Union also received relatively substantial grants from development partners to support the economic programmes implemented"(UEMOA Economic Report, 2010).

Still based on available data, the report argues that "the foreign transactions of the UEMOA countries for the first quarter of 2010 recorded a global deficit of 47.8 billion, marking a sharp drop from the 683.7 surplus recorded in the last quarter of 2009". This decline reflects "on the one hand, seasonal trends usually characterised by an increase in the external trade balance in the final quarter, as a result of a boost in the marketing certain products such as cocoa, and of intensified mobilisation". On the other hand, "it is linked to the rise in prices of imported essential commodities, and the increase in capital goods needs induced by on-going investment projects in certain countries which impact negatively on trade balance". The Outlook specifies however, that "the data analysed does not include Burkina Faso, which had not produced its external accounts"(UEMOA Economic Report, 2010).

### 2.1.2. Debt

The West African countries, like other developing countries, were confronted, at the end of the 1980s, with the problem of their external debt. The explosion of the debt was due, among others, to an increase in bilateral and concessional loans, the absence of macroeconomic adjustment in these countries, and a number of exogenous shocks at the national and international levels, which impeded economic growth.

Debt is a complex equation for African countries in general, and for West African countries in particular. The level of indebtedness is such that it militates against the development of the countries of this region.

Virtually all African countries face the thorny problem of allocating a significant share of the public revenue to the service of external debt, to the detriment of health, education and other collective social services. As a matter of fact, of the 41 countries classified as poor and highly indebted, 33 are in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, these countries lack the capacity to repay their debt. In the period from 1990 to 1998, the total debt load of the continent averaged 318.7 billion dollars, but rose in 1999 to steady at 337.2 billion dollars, or 61.4% of the continent's GDP, and 225.3% of its exports. This represents 61.4% of Gross domestic product (GDP) or 225.3% of exports. Of the 53 countries in the continent, 16, including Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Cape Verde in West Africa, recorded and increase in debt servicing in terms of percentage of GDP.

The debt for all West African countries was estimated at 70 billion USD in 1999, after peaking at 77.28 billion dollars in 1995. Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria with respectively 15.1 and 33.5 billion dollars in debt account for about 70% of the total debt of member countries of the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS). The debt burden of the two heavyweights of the region represents respectively 134.3% and 96.4% of GDP. Côte d'Ivoire is also amongst the countries with the highest external debt. The other two countries are Guinea Bissau (370%) and Sierra Leone (140%). Although the debt burden of a country like Guinea Bissau does not, at 0.8 billion dollars, represent a high level of indebtedness compared to the other ECOWAS countries, it is, since it represents 370% of GDP, sufficiently high to mortgage the country's development. In other words, it is virtually impossible for this country to even embark upon development in any form, if must at the same time address the problem of its indebtedness. The Gambia (0.4 billion dollars), Guinea Conakry (3.4 billion), Togo (1.3 billion), Niger (1.7 billion), Mali (3.3 billion) and Ghana (6.6 billion) whose debt stock represents respectively 106.4%, 90.5%, 92.5%, 81.8%, 128.3%, and 86.1% of GDP, are all in the same situation. Senegal and Liberia, each with 2.9 billion dollars and 2.0 billion dollars of debt, respectively, have a smaller debt stock to GDP ratio (about 60%). Benin, Burkina Faso and Cape Verde with a stock of 57.6%, 58% and 45.2% of GDP respectively have the lowest indebtedness level, in nominal terms, in the Community, oscillating between 0.3 and 1.5 billion dollars. It fluctuates between 0.3 and 1.5 billion dollars. Table 3 shows the trend in indebtedness in the 15 countries of the sub-region over the last decade.

Table 3 : External Debt (USD billions)

Country	2000	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Benin	1.266	1.519	1.433	1.743	994	625	1.038	1.165
Burkina Faso	1.384	1.567	1.649	2.218	1.155	1.253	1.868	2.048
Cape Verde	310	329	434	577	593	596	654	718
Côte d'Ivoire	9.253	9.931	10.056	11.796	12.160	13.335	13.147	11.994
The Gambia	437	504	506	528	352	363	377	392
Ghana	6.037	6.751	8.197	6.743	3.192	4.898	5.173	5.382
Guinea	3.086	3.115	3.341	3.247	3.217	3.307	3.079	3.374
Guinea Bissau	774	812	878	1.039	1.003	893	961	887
Liberia	2.393	2.782	2.835	3.185	3.246	3.309	3.160	3.160
Mali	2.106	2.817	2.833	3.290	1.253	1.438	1.854	1.941
Niger	1.420	1.779	1.683	1.814	538	672	546	489
Nigeria	30.695	30.535	34.662	20.526	7.693	8.049	8.791	9.459
Senegal	3.118	3.737	3.940	3.687	3.455	1.878	1.962	1.757
Sierra Leone	1.428	1.177	1.464	1.214	1.152	1.225	1.291	1.360
Togo	1.203	1.436	1.423	1.556	1.497	1.768	1.337	1.188
UEMOA	20.525	23.597	23.894	27.142	22.055	21.862	22.713	21.470
WAMZ	44.387	45.194	51.438	36.018	19.445	21.747	22.526	23.844
ECOWAS	64.911	68.791	75.332	63.161	41.499	43.610	45.239	45.314

Source: ECA SRO-WA, from ECOWAS official statistics (2009)

The above figures serve as a clear proof that West Africa is staggering under the weight of its indebtedness. The ECOWAS Executive Secretary's Annual Report (2010) states that "Twelve of the ECOWAS countries are classified among the highly indebted countries. The obligations linked to debt servicing absorb an average of 30% of the export earnings of the Community. Debt-related expenditure is, on average, three times higher than expenditure on education and health".

Overall, repayment of a debt whose nominal value continues to grow as a result of its service would appear to be the greatest obstacle to the development of Africa in general and West Africa in particular. For many of the countries of the region the outstanding debt seriously compromises economic recovery and the achievement of sustained growth. According to some experts, there is the additional risk of undermining improvements in the economic sector, since all increases in income and production are swallowed up by debt servicing. Any substantial accumulation of the external debt is likely to impede investment, slow down economic growth, and increase macroeconomic instability.

This disastrous situation led to the conclusion of bilateral agreements sponsored by the creditors of the Paris Club<sup>1</sup>. These agreements were subsequently complemented by the debt relief initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) of 1996 and enhanced in the 1999 version.

Under the terms of the HIPC initiative launched by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1996 and enhanced in 1999, sustainable external debt level was fixed at an average external debt-to-GDP ratio of 45%, and an average debt-to-export ratio of 150%. Finally, donors promised in 2005 to cancel the entire debt held by the World Bank's International Development Association, the IMF, the African Development Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank for countries that reached the completion point under the HIPC initiative.

The debt cancellation initiatives by China in favour of many African countries have been well received. In the first quarter of 2009, China had already cancelled 150 debts in favour of 32 African countries. This followed commitments made at the 2006 summit of the Sino-African Cooperation Forum in Beijing where forgiveness of the interest-free loans falling due for repayment at the end of 2005 was announced. The beneficiaries were the 33 heavily indebted African countries which had established diplomatic relations with China and least developed countries.

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1 The Paris Club is an informal group of creditor countries whose role is to find coordinated and durable solutions to the difficulties experienced by indebted countries in the repayment of their debt. The creditors of the Paris Club grant debt relief in order to help the countries readjust their financial situation. Conditionalities related to the solutions offered by the Paris Club are often leading to dependencies.

At the same time, 13 African countries were accorded a 100% cancellation of their debt in the total amount of 3 billion dollars by the International Monetary Fund. They were among the 19 countries whose debt was cancelled by the IMF, in order, as the organisation stated in a Communiqué, “to enable them to increase expenditure in priority areas with a view to reducing poverty, promoting growth and making progress towards the achievement of the millennium development goals”. The West African beneficiaries under this measure were Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

Africa’s external debt fell from 62.4% of GDP to 23.1% in the ten years from 1998 to 2007. According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (2009), this success was due to the improvement in the economic performance of the African countries and the debt relief through the HIPC initiative and the multilateral debt relief initiative for low income countries. The stock of outstanding external debt as a percentage of GDP dropped from 62% for the period from 1998 to 2001, to 47.2%, for the period from 2000 to 2005, and to 23.1% in 2007, according to the 2009 ECA report.

### 2.1.3. Employment

In a much-publicised statement made in 2006, Charles Atangana (AEM) UK warns that “youth unemployment in Africa constitutes a more serious threat than terrorism— an H-bomb that political leaders must disarm by all means possible”.

All employment figures indicate that the youth represent 37% of the working-age population, and 60% of all unemployed. Young people start working at an early age, with a quarter of children aged 5 to 14 actively employed, especially in rural areas. Youth unemployment is more widespread in urban areas, while underemployment is more predominant in rural areas.

The youth are primarily employed in the agriculture sector, where they account for 65% of the total work force. This frightening number shows the vital importance of the problem of youth employment. However, experts acknowledge that “with some 1.5 billion young people between the ages of 12 to 24 in the world, the next generation represents a tremendous opportunity to accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty”. Denouncing the “intolerable” levels reached by youth unemployment and other forms of social exclusion in several countries, the Director-General of the International Labour Office (ILO) called on these countries to adopt exceptional and immediate measures in favour of workers caught in the trap in poorly paid jobs or victims of long-term unemployment. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Hansenne, “If we fail to contain the social costs of the economic transformations wrought by globalisation and technological change, we risk being swept into a perilous zone of social and political turmoil”.



From 2008 to 2009, the population of Africa grew by 2.3% to approximately 1 billion inhabitants. Of this number, 70% are under the age of 30 years, making Africa one of the youngest continents in the world<sup>2</sup>. The young men and women have potentials that remain unharnessed because of the absence of initiatives, funds, qualifications and strategies. It is important, and high time for national policies reflecting these realities to be put into effect to mitigate any possible damage. There is no doubt that high levels of youth unemployment in West Africa constitute a challenge to sustainable development and a source of major concern to the countries of the sub-region as well as intergovernmental organisations.

Africa in general and West Africa in particular have recorded relatively high growth rates in the last five years, with the continental average peaking at 6.1% in 2007. However, this growth has not been paralleled by an expansion of the labour market. This is a major problem calling for fundamental shock treatment, since implementation and concrete results expected of the national job promotion policies are slow to manifest. West Africa stands in need of strategies to support youth self-employment and break the yoke of unemployment and poverty. This report places West Africa in its sub-regional context and presents an analysis of principal trends and causes of youth unemployment in the countries of the sub-region. It identifies the challenges facing youth in or seeking self-employment.

The data in table 4 below shows relatively strong growth in virtually all ECOWAS countries from 2001 to 2008. In spite of fluctuations, regional growth rate as a whole was positive and clearly above 2% annually. However, there are significant disparities between countries. Some countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and Sierra Leone) witnessed a dip in economic activity (negative growth rate). Growth was moderate in Togo and irregular in countries such as Guinea Bissau, Niger, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, there was an economic downturn between 2001 and 2003, probably because of the unrest in the country.

In the table 4 below, it should be pointed out that the rates used for 2007 and 2008 are estimates, which turned out to be higher for 2007 and lower for 2008 in subsequent calculations for all of ECOWAS, at 5.1% and 5.3% respectively. Economic growth rate estimates in 2009 stand at 4.1%, down 1.2 points compared with 2008, due to the effects of the international economic and financial crises that spared no region in the world (ECA, 2010).

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2 UNECA (2010). *Economic report on Africa 2010: Promoting high-level sustainable growth to reduce unemployment in Africa*, UNECA, Addis Ababa.

Table 4: GDP Growth Rate at 2010 Constant Prices

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Benin	6.10	4.50	4.12	3.10	5.36	6.38	4.00	5.30
Burkina Faso	5.90	4.97	7.82	5.07	6.82	7.66	6.00	6.10
Cape Verde	5.43	4.36	4.91	3.96	2.44	3.98	3.80	5.30
Côte d'Ivoire	-0.55	-1.97	-1.70	1.60	1.00	2.50	1.70	3.80
The Gambia	5.80	4.75	5.07	5.31	2.77	3.99	7.00	6.00
Ghana	2.32	6.63	5.63	5.87	5.77	0.82	6.30	6.90
Guinea	3.78	4.72	1.03	2.68	2.20	7.10	1.50	5.10
Guinea Bissau	0.20	-6.83	0.70	3.96	4.02	4.46	2.50	2.10
Liberia	13.60	-0.70	-23.98	22.27	9.65	14.01	9.40	10.40
Mali	12.32	4.19	7.79	1.16	7.68	7.71	5.20	4.80
Niger	-17.30	5.60	4.71	-1.97	7.72	5.10	3.13	4.30
Nigeria	3.81	2.20	11.00	5.98	6.35	7.10	4.30	8.00
Senegal	4.58	0.65	6.66	5.58	5.47	3.96	5.10	5.70
Sierra Leone:	-12.85	49.94	11.96	9.53	7.87	16.35	7.40	7.00
Togo	1.61	3.03	2.09	4.41	1.12	4.12	2.90	3.50
ECOWAS:	2.91	2.80	7.35	4.97	5.49	6.10	4.26	6.82

Source: ECOWAS National Accounts (2006) and IMF, World Economic Outlook Year, Washington D.C.

In spite of this relatively strong growth, unemployment continued to grow in West Africa. Average unemployment rate in the sub-region stood at 6 % (estimation based on data from the ILO, KILM database, March 2009). This overall rate however masks significant disparities based on age group, place of residence and country. The youngest age group is hit hardest by unemployment. In Ghana for instance, the unemployment of youth was estimated to 25.6% in 2006 (Ghana statistical service, January 10, 2006). The findings of the survey by the National Institute of Statistic and Population (INSD) in Burkina Faso put unemployment rates at 15 % in urban areas and 2 % in rural ones. In Niger, overall unemployment rate is 15.9%. Unlike in Burkina Faso, unemployment rate in Niger is 19.4% in urban areas, but remains high in rural areas at 15.18% (Niger, 2006). In Cape Verde, national unemployment rate is 17%, with a high rate evaluated at 38% amongst youth aged 15-29 years (ADB, 2009).

Why does the strong growth recorded in the various West African countries not generate enough jobs to reverse the trend? The data in table 2 on productivity growth in the ECOWAS zone provides an initial answer. Calculations show a strong average work productivity growth (GDP and population report) from 2002-2008. However, production growth is equal to the sum of growth due to the variation of volume of work and growth due to the evolution of work productivity (Balies, 2002). Thus, if growth of work productivity is higher than economic growth, the volume of work can stagnate or diminish. The combination of results in tables 1 and 2 show that average work productivity grew faster than GDP is virtually all countries. This provides an

initial theoretical explanation as to why the level of employment has failed to improve since this period in ECOWAS countries.

Amongst the main challenges facing Africa in general and West Africa in particular, there is continuous population growth, modest economic prospects, high illiteracy rate and the education system that is not aligned with the needs of the job market. This is compounded by the growing proportion of the youth in jobs that are precarious, poorly paid and without health cover or even social protection, to the extent that “youth unemployment drastically slows down the process of socio-economic development”.

#### 2.1.4. Inflation

One of the factors which erode the well-being of the African peoples and curtail the effectiveness of poverty reduction measures is inflation, or the generalised rise in prices; it is cumulative, self-sustaining and protracted.

Inflation in poor countries appears to be essentially attributable to a rise in production costs (raw materials, fuel and also production-related taxes). This description corresponds most closely to the form of inflation experienced in Africa. Demand or currency inflation is purely monetary in origin. It arises from the issuance of large quantities of currency which leads consumers to increase their demand on the market. This in turn triggers a rise in prices which could become widespread. However, this type of inflation does not affect Africa where banks are generally reluctant to release sufficient quantities of funds into the production system. There is also the problem of excess cash in circulation.

As a sign of inflation, prices of energy, transportation, fuel, construction materials, and basic food stuffs have all increased in recent times. The levels of inflation can be due to both internal and external factors.

The internal factor is linked to the intrinsic nature of the economy of scarcity which prevails in poor countries. An economy of scarcity is one in which resource-strapped enterprises are unable to satisfy the demand for goods. Production in an economy of scarcity is too low, from all standpoints, to satisfy social demand. As a result, because offer is lower than demand, prices tend to increase.

The exogenous factor is the rise in prices in the industrialised countries, which causes the poor countries to import the inflation created by others. The situation appears to be linked to the price of petroleum which in itself is dependent on the level of the dollar's exchange rate. In order to accumulate enough income, the petroleum-producing countries need the dollar to be stable. If the dollar falls, it will increase the

price of petroleum. It is important to note that the price of petroleum automatically increases when the dollar value falls.

However, it is not only the price of fuel that increases in the African countries. Every other imported item (e.g. foodstuffs, manufactured goods, and other materials) increases in price. According to the Economic Outlook for Africa (EOA) which is published by the African Development Bank inflation rates in all West African countries underwent a “gradual reflux” in 2009 and 2010. (AfDB, 2009).

Average inflation rate in West Africa steadied at 10.6% in 2008, as against 5.4% in 2007, according to the Outlook. It goes on to observe that the UEMOA countries whose currency is linked to the Euro, continue to register “average” inflation rates, well below that of the member countries of the West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ) zone comprising The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, five countries which are working towards the establishment of a single currency, while UEMOA is a group of eight countries, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, which already have a single currency. The ADB document underscores the fact that inflation remained “constant” in Guinea, at 19.3%, a “slight improvement” on 2007. Elsewhere, inflation gained ground between 2007 and 2008. In Nigeria, according to the document, inflation rose (from 5.4% to 11%), in Ghana (from 10.7% to 14.1%), in Sierra Leone (from 12.1 to 13%), in Liberia (from 11.4 to 17.5%), in Cape Verde which generally fares better than its West African neighbours (from 4.3 to 6.7%), and in The Gambia (from 5.4 to 6.4%).

The following table 5 shows that inflation in West Africa is higher in the non-UEMOA countries of Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. These countries operate non-convertible currencies which inspire mistrust due to their instability and the fact that they are not guaranteed by a country with a strong currency. This necessarily raises the issue of the need for monetary integration at the level of the entire West African region.

Table 5 : Annual Average Inflation Rates in the ECOWAS Countries

Year/Country	2000	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Benin	4.2	2.4	1.5	5.4	3.8	1.3	8.1	6.5
Burkina Faso	-0.3	2.3	2.0	6.4	2.3	-0.2	10.8	5.0
Cape Verde	6.6	1.8	2.3	0.4	4.8	4.4	5.7	4.9
Côte d'Ivoire	1.6	3.2	3.3	3.9	2.5	1.9	6.5	5.7
The Gambia	0.8	5.5	17.6	0.8	2.1	5.4	6.0	5.5
Ghana	3.7	14.5	13.0	15.1	10.2	10.7	16.8	13.3
Guinea	6.0	3.0	12.9	31.4	34.7	22.9	17.9	9.3
Guinea Bissau	8.6	3.3	-3.5	3.4	2.0	4.6	10.6	6.2
Liberia	10.0	14.6	10.4	6.9	7.2	11.4	19.2	11.4
Mali	3.3	5.0	-1.3	6.4	1.5	1.4	9.6	2.5
Niger	2.9	2.6	-1.6	7.8	0.1	0.0	13.1	3.5
Nigeria	5.5	12.9	14.0	17.8	8.3	5.5	11.0	11.1
Senegal	0.7	2.3	0.1	1.7	2.1	5.9	6.3	3.0
Sierra Leone	-0.9	-3.1	7.4	12.1	9.5	11.7	15.3	13.9
Togo	1.9	3.1	-1.0	6.8	2.2	1.0	8.4	5.2
UEMOA	1.8	3.0	1.3	4.6	2.2	2.1	8.1	4.6
WAMZ	5.3	12.0	13.5	17.8	9.4	6.7	11.8	11.2
ECOWAS	4.2	9.0	9.3	13.9	7.6	5.6	10.9	9.8

**Source:** ECA SRO-WA, based on official ECOWAS statistics; IMF(2009)., Global Economic Outlook, April 2009 Washington D. C.

Although subsidies could cushion against rising inflation, they may not be appropriate means because tax increases become necessary in the medium term in order to finance these subsidies, and the tax increases can themselves lead to price increases. This increase in the levels of tax will push prices up further and compromise the intended effects.

Moreover, the State should play no role in influencing currency exchange rates. This could curtail private initiative and trigger economic drift. A more appropriate solution to counter price increases is to encourage and motivate users of final products to consume local products. At the same time, producers (enterprises) would need to improve on both quantity and quality. Another solution would be to move towards the valorisation of unprocessed goods and raw materials locally, instead of exporting them as are. It is also important to strengthen intra-African trade links, without overlooking the importance of cutting down on Government maintenance standards.

The problems identified – budget deficits, debt, unemployment and under-employment, inflation - are invariably linked to the events and activities taking place within the different economic sectors, which should be identified and analyzed. These sectors include agriculture, mining, industry, trade, and natural resources.

## 2.2 Performance in Major Economic Sectors


In spite of the fact that the demands of globalization oblige African countries to diversify their economies, most of them are still agriculture-based. Agriculture remains vital in generating revenue for the State and households. The other sectors, oil, mining, industries and trade are equally important and should be promoted.

### 2.2.1. Agriculture

Agriculture remains central to the West African economy, contributing about 35% of GDP in the ECOWAS region and up to 80% in some countries. It constitutes the major source of income and the means of subsistence for between 70 and 80% of the population in the sub-region. In Burkina Faso and Mali, the sector employs about 80% of the population. It is also a source for food and export earning from cash crops. The sector provides food and export earnings from its cash crops. Agriculture contributes approximately 40% to export earnings in ECOWAS and 21% of imports (IFPRI 2003). In fact, countries like Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali are driven mainly by trade in cotton, the main cash crop. Nigeria and Senegal rank as the two top producers of groundnuts. Côte d'Ivoire derives a large part of its income from coffee, and together with Ghana, are a major producers of cocoa.

This notwithstanding, the performance of the agricultural sector is especially low as Africa is one of the rare continents where per capita agricultural production has been falling over the past forty years. This fall, which is estimated at 0.34% in sub-Saharan Africa, basically affects the survival of rural households due to the dwindling of incomes and worsens food shortage (Dia & Fall, 2005). Rising food prices remain a serious concern in the sub region and these continue to exacerbate the chronic food insecurity in countries like Mali and Niger.

**Graph 5: World index prices 2001 to 2010**



Source: Index Mundi (2010): World Prices 2001 - 2010

Agriculture in West Africa suffers from low productivity. Yields are generally very low, after-harvest losses are high, and value-addition is weak. Further, the sector is subject to frequent climate hazards, parasite infestation, locust attacks, and soil degradation. There is low utilization of fertilizer. An estimated 0.8 kg per hectare is used on average compared to a 150 to 200 kg/ha need. There is a low level of mechanisation and animal draught power is the most common. Further, the percentage of irrigated land is very low (4%) as compared to 39.3% in Southern Asia, and a world average of 20%. Most West African farmers are very poor. They suffer more than city dwellers, and face difficulties accessing credit, healthcare, facilities, and sending their children to school.

All these conditions, low production, low productivity and yield, are responsible for the failure of agriculture to contribute significantly to poverty reduction in West Africa, despite its potential. At its current performance level, the sector is not capable of guaranteeing food security, or eradicating hunger. In fact, the production and productivity levels of food crops is not sufficient to feed the population adequately – hence the need for imports of certain cereals.

It is thus not surprising that food insecurity remains a major structural problem in West Africa. An estimated 40 million people out of a population of 265 million suffer from chronic malnutrition, and the effects of crises affect dozens of millions of persons every year. In light of this, the AFD (French Development Agency) allocated a subsidy of 10.4 million Euros to the Economic Community of West African States in 2010, to finance a food and nutritional security support programme in West Africa. With the development of tools to reduce price volatility and improve access to food products, the programme is expected to help improve the living conditions of households, particularly of the poorest households, and revitalise agricultural production and regional trade.

The food situation in West Africa remains precarious despite all efforts deployed by the States. This situation may worsen due to many interrelated factors including:

- Political crises linked to wars and to the democratization process;
- The steady degradation of the soil and climate;
- Difficulties accessing factors of production;
- Increasing poverty and lack of control over stocks of foodstuffs;
- Irregular rainfall in the region; and
- Lack of control over water resources, an indispensable factor for agriculture.

The limitations of the sub-regional productive capacity imply heavy dependence on imports. With very few exceptions, food products constitute a substantial proportion of the imports of the countries of the sub-region. In the West African corridor which is considered highly conducive to agricultural production, the high level of immigration affecting the coastal countries, taken in conjunction, in the last few years, with the


arrival of refugees from countries in crisis, encourages the rapid growth of towns and cities and destabilises food offer.

In addition, the sub-region is experiencing difficulties in ensuring better feeding for its population due to the fact that the present level of its resources (technical, technological, financial, etc.) does not permit proper monitoring of the rate and current evolution of world trends, particularly with regard to globalisation and economic liberalisation. The instability of food offer at all levels is undoubtedly responsible for the growing interest in sustained food security. A multitude of initiatives are springing up all over the West African sub-region in this area, involving the State, RECs, research networks, economic operators, producers and non-Governmental organisations.

### 2.2.2. Petroleum

Petroleum prices have recovered from the low prices experienced at the height of the crisis in August 2008. The prices have continued on an upward trend and for the oil-producing countries in the sub region, these developments are most welcome. Yet for the majority oil-importing member States, these developments bring in challenges as the import bills will increase.

**Graph 6: Evolution of world oil prices**



**Source:** Index Mundi, 2010: Evolution of world oil prices

Nigeria, the continent's largest producer, currently accounts for 86% of total petroleum output for West Africa, and almost all the natural gas in the sub-region. In January 2006, Nigeria's proven petroleum reserves are estimated at 35.9 billion barrels, or 32% of all African reserves and 3% of world proven reserves. Nigeria possesses 5.2 cu m. of proven natural gas reserves representing 36% of total African reserves and 2.9% of world proven reserves. Over the last ten years, petroleum production in Nigeria




registered an average annual increase of 3%, to reach 2.6 mmbd., and an 18% or 20 cum. annual increase in gas production. Its petroleum and gas production is expected to rise sharply in the next few years, driven by the opening up of new deposits and the start-up of LNG processing plants.

In the last few years two new petroleum-producing countries have emerged on the West African scene: Ghana and Niger. Côte d'Ivoire, the third biggest producer in the region (98 mbd), possesses proven reserves estimated at 100 million barrels, and 86% of its oil wells are offshore, in deep seas. Production comes mainly from the Espoir and Baobab deposits where exploitation began in 2002 and 2005 respectively. Gas was discovered in the 1980s but exploitation began only recently. Gas production in 2003 was 1.46 cu m., while reserves were estimated at 31cu m. Ghana, at 6 mbd, has the lowest petroleum production level of the region. Exploration is on-going, with several independent petroleum companies expressing an interest in procuring exploration and production licences. In addition, there is on-going petroleum exploration in Mali, where early indications are of large deposits in the northern part of the country.

### 2.2.3. Minerals Sector


Mineral prices remained comparatively high even during the financial crisis in 2008 despite the slight dip experienced at the time. They have since strengthened as economic recovery has concretised especially in the Western World which had been adversely affected by the crisis. Graphs 7 and 8 show the evolution of gold prices and the metal price index respectively between 2001 and 2010.

**Graph 7: Evolution of world gold prices**



**Source:** Index Mundi, 2010 : Evolution of World Gold Price 2001 – 2010

**Graph 8: Evolution of metal price index**



**Source:** Index Mundi 2010: Metal Price Index 2001 - 2010

The West African mining sector represents more than 40 percent of total exports. Together, the countries possess the richest reserves of bauxite in the world, some of the richest deposits of iron ore, very high grade gold deposits, diamonds, uranium, and substantial deposits of numerous industrial minerals.

The substantial mineral resources of the African continent are estimated to represent 30% of proven world reserves. Africa's share of world reserves in the following indicative list of minerals is as follows: platinum - 89%; chromium - 81%; manganese - 61%; bauxite - 30%; and gold - 40%. Africa is estimated to produce 50% of world supplies of diamonds; 15% of bauxite, 25% of gold, and 20% of uranium. The share of mineral exploitation in Africa represents up to 50% of GDP in some countries. The sector contributes to economic and industrial diversification, participates in job creation, and constitutes a source of income and foreign currency earnings for the States. In view of the diversity of stakeholders involved and the importance of the goods and services produced, the knock-on effects of mineral exploitation in Africa are significant in global economic terms.

The effects of development in the mining sector on the biophysical and human environment are considerable. The mining techniques currently in use are not always sustainable. The most harmful impacts of mining on both the population and the ecosystems are soil degradation, pollution of surface water and of the water table, destruction of natural habitats, atmospheric pollution, socio-cultural and economic upheaval at the local level, and other equally undesirable effects on the health and welfare of the people.

West Africa has earned substantial levels of income from its mineral reserves, which could be used to help finance development. This is the case of bauxite and phosphates in Guinea, of uranium in Niger (the leading regional producer), of diamonds in Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia, of rutile in Sierra Leone, of iron ore in Mauritania and Guinea, and of gold in Ghana and Mali . Especially in this period of crisis, with gold as a safe value, these countries will have been able to realise enormous profits from this sector.

In Mali for example, between 1997 and 2005, gold exports stood at CFAF2.290 billion. In the village of Sanso – a village in the South of Mali- the surface area under cultivation declined by 68.4% within five years between 1999 and 2004, with mining activity increasing, resulting in the disappearance of three quarters of farms. The industrial mining sector employs 12,000 people, accounting for a tenth of the wage bill of the formal sector.

In recent years, West Africa has become the preferred destination for investor funds earmarked for the mining sector in Africa due to an improved investment climate and a relatively positive risk profile. The conducive situation on the market for raw materials and the availability of capital for exploration and exploitation, combined with highly prospective geology (especially for precious minerals such as gold) in West Africa have created enabling conditions for the development of mining projects in the sub-region. While this situation opens up real opportunities for all the countries concerned, it also creates a number of challenges calling for appropriate responses at the regional level, to the issues of management and development in the mining sector. The key for the sub region is to ensure that a development-oriented policy environment is created in the sector. Mineral resource exploitation has to tangibly contribute to national development goals through linkages and value-addition.

#### 2.2.4. Industry

The West African industrial sector is small compared to that of other sub-regions on the continent. Its relative share in economic activity has remained stagnant for the last few years. The industrial potential in this sub-region focuses mainly on the agro-food sector (e.g. oil pastes, preserves, and brews), cigarette manufacture and textile industries, which regrettably have little or no knock-on effect on the rest of the economy. However, based on the conviction that textiles could become a lead sub-sector, UEMOA political leaders put in place a textile development strategy which provides for the creation of “a regional, dynamic textile industry capable of processing 25% of the local cotton production, and of generating 50,000 industrial jobs”. West Africa remains one of the regions in the world where there is limited industrial development. The absence of a genuine industrial policy is the main reason

for the lack of industrial development in the sub-region. The lack of an industrial development is also attributable to many factors including the following:

- Inadequate financing for a sector which is essentially embryonic and does not inspire
- enough confidence to attract foreign direct investment;
- The external orientation of the West African economies which tend to import rather than
- produce the manufactured goods which its peoples need; and
- The increasing competition from cheap manufactured products from Asia and
- particularly from China.

The productive capacity of Africa is constrained by many factors including:

- The absolute weakness of production levels in terms of both quantity and quality;
- The absence of a genuine industrial fabric. The few African products are essentially consumer goods, since the manufacturers generally restrict their activities to the food, textile, drinks and tobacco industries; and
- The obsolescence of the machinery and equipment used in the industries. This invariably leads to low productivity and reduces competitiveness on the international market.

Recent trends from the stagnation of African industries and the rapid transformation taking place in other regions of the world (e.g. Asia), have further increased Africa's backwardness. Indeed many so-called industries in Africa are industries only in name. They are in fact assembly or processing units, or even repair workshops.

As a result, there are practically no inter-industrial relations or "channels". African industry is positioned preponderantly at the end of the production chain, and its special links are upstream, with foreign suppliers, capital goods and semi-processed product. Integration into the national economy is minimal and fragile. In short, West Africa, like the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, is lagging behind in terms of its industrialisation.

Responding to this unfavourable situation, the Council of Ministers of the Economic Community of West African Countries met in the second quarter of 2010 to adopt a West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP), and called on the ECOWAS Commission to take appropriate measures to ensure its rapid implementation. The policy seeks to diversify and expand the industrial production base in West Africa, bringing it gradually to an average of 30% by 2030, through the introduction of support measures for the creation of new production units and the development and modernisation of existing ones.

One of the major challenges confronting this policy is that of raising the share of the manufacturing industry in regional GDP to 20% by 2030, as against its present share of between 6 and 7%. The WACIP also seeks to boost intra-Community trade by raising it from its present level of 13% to 40% by 2030.

UEMOA, equally anxious to improve the productivity and competitiveness of its industrial enterprises, envisages granting support to 1,000 agro-industrial enterprises within the UEMOA zone. This support will be two-phased, beginning with 120 pre-selected industries, and followed by the other 880 enterprises in the Union. The exercise has already taken off in most of the countries of the sub-region, within the framework of the Restructuring and Upgrading Programme (RUP) for industries. The RUP is an initiative devised within the framework of the policy for the revitalisation of industrial production in the eight UEMOA member countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The programme seeks, among other aims, to raise the productivity and competitiveness of industries struggling with structural and operational dysfunctions.

Particular emphasis should be laid on industrial development in West Africa, with a view to rendering its economies more viable, dynamic and capable of guaranteeing the sustainable wellbeing of the society. Without a sustained industrial policy, the road to development is likely to be much longer, since industry is in fact a sector with an enormous capacity for wealth multiplication, and the ability to effectively drive the rest of the economy.

#### 2.2.5. Trade Development


The pace of global economic integration is accelerating. The creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 was a veritable symbol of near-universal adherence to market principles and free trade. The increase, year after year, of the share of international trade in global production and consumption and in the production and consumption of the individual nations, only serves to underscore the interdependence of economies. It is against this backdrop that trade relations between African countries of the same sub-region, and between them and the outside world, and also between China and Africa must be pursued.

Sub-regional and inter-regional trade is growing in strength, more in response to political than to economic imperatives. It is principally through trade that the West African countries seek to achieve economic growth and development. Indeed, from this standpoint, the classic definition of a developing country is one in which the bulk of export earnings derive from one or a few raw materials. This is the case for all West African countries. Mali is an example of a country in which, since its independence in 1960, cotton has been the only export product, generating 60% of the country's

export earnings. It is only recently that gold made its appearance as a driving force in Mali's growth. The same pattern is true for Senegal with regard to groundnuts, and for Côte d'Ivoire with regard to coffee and cocoa. However, according to Professor François Perroux (French Economist, 1950), "the imprudent extraversion of the national economy, amidst the success of exports, tends to weaken the nation's industrial potential and, in the most serious cases, to disorganize its productive capacity". Despite the clarifications that it provides for the benefit of developing countries, the theory of comparative advantage offers no more than the beginning of an explanation for the development of international trade. It makes no provision for mechanisms to explain the modalities for economic development in time, and with reference to their production structure, consumption and trade. The reasoning of the theory explains certain aspects of growth, leaving many things unexplained (see Graph 9).

Intra-regional trade between West African countries remains weak. The trend for the period from 1999 to 2009 was in the nature of a seesaw, before stabilizing.


**Graph 9: Trend of the ECOWAS external trade between 1999 and 2009**



**Source:** ECOWAS (2009), Report title, Abuja (Nigeria)

The trend in market share indicates that while ECOWAS was able to affect a small breakthrough into the American market (see graph 10 below), trade relations with Europe declined.

**Graph 10: Trend in market share of ECOWAS exports**



Source: ECOWAS 2009, Abuja (Nigeria)

Although intra-Community trade within ECOWAS has risen slightly, trade volume remains low. This appears to be due to the fact that the countries of the region engage much more with Europe and Asia and increasingly with America than with one another. Their external trade exports are primarily raw materials (e.g. cotton, coffee, cocoa, petroleum, bauxite, and manganese), while imports include capital goods, machinery, food and manufactured goods, thus fulfilling all the criteria for dependent economies. The dependent economy criterion is thus confirmed. Consequently, the trade relations between the West African countries cannot be such as to generate strong growth, despite all the facilitation measures introduced.

The marginal role of West Africa in global trade is attributable to a number of factors, particularly the nature and characteristics of its exports, restrictions in access to the markets of the wealthy countries, and constraints relating to offer. The weakness of intra-African trade, which is a result of limited regional integration, is significant in this regard, because it also limits the opportunities for the African countries to learn experience through practice. The smaller external markets do not have the scope which would allow African enterprises to build up their skills, or teach the export sector to absorb the shocks of the international market. They also limit the possibility of their practicing economies of scale. As a result, many enterprises tend to avoid the risks inherent to the more competitive export markets. The existence of a wider African market would enable African enterprises to perfect their skills and consolidate experience – hence the need to deepen sub-regional integration in West Africa as a first step towards improving the competitiveness of its export products.

The problem of trade-driven growth in the West African countries is once again the focus of close consideration in acknowledgement of the fact that the West African market represents only 1% of global trade. Nonetheless, useful exchanges of ideas have taken place among the countries of the sub-region on ways and means of containing this crisis, and facilitating the growth of intra-Community trade in West Africa, particularly through the formulation and implementation of common trade policies.

The focus of these discussions is the elimination of tariff and customs barriers. One of the last meeting on this important issue was held in May 2010 in Banjul, The Gambia. According to the ECOWAS database (2009), the West African sub-region is the leading African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) region in trade with nearly 41% of total European Union (EU)-ACP trade. Of the 10 leading trade partners in the ACP region, 5 are from West Africa: Nigeria 18%; Liberia 5%; Côte d'Ivoire 4%; Senegal 4%; and Ghana 4%. In 2002, ECOWAS region exports to the European Union (EU) were valued at nearly 11 billion Euros, of which 34% was petroleum, 16% cocoa beans, and nearly 4% natural gas. Other exports were mostly of unprocessed goods such as wood, aluminium, fish, diamonds and gold.

European Union exports to West Africa are mainly motors, cars and spare parts, drugs, and computer and telecommunications equipment. 32% of exports from the region are destined for Europe, and 99.8% of these products are granted duty-free access to the European Union market. 41% of all imports into the West African region are from the European Union.

Consequently, Africa's share in China's external trade (3% in 2005 and 2.5% for sub-Saharan Africa) is twice higher than its share in global trade. The China-Africa trade is characteristically asymmetrical: Africa is a small-scale supplier and outlet for China, while China is one of Africa's principal trade partners.

As discussed earlier, Africa provides an outlet for cheap Chinese manufactured exports and the latter's strong growth and requirements in terms of oil and other commodities stimulate trade with Africa, where there is an abundance of these products. Africa's exports to China grew annually by 48% between 1999 and 2004, and continue to do so. In 2005, 10% of Africa's exports were to China. China is Africa's leading supplier of manufactured goods, clothing, textiles, machinery, and transportation equipment. It is Africa's second outlet after the United States, and imports oil and raw materials.

West Africa gets the bulk of its export revenues from a limited number of natural resources and agricultural produce. It practices a very limited degree of export diversification: about 90% of the exports from the countries comprise of petroleum (from Nigeria) and a few primary products with little value added and highly dependent on world prices and climate hazards.

It should be recalled that ECOWAS has embarked on the procedure for the introduction of its common external tariff, and engaged negotiations for the conclusion of an EPA with the EU on behalf of the whole of West Africa. Given the importance for the economies of the region, of the stakes involved in the establishment of these two instruments of trade policy, the finalised version of both instruments must take into due account the need to ensure economic growth and strengthen intra-regional trade.



## Chapter 3

# Social and Environmental Developments in West Africa

Development is supposed to contribute to the material and moral wellbeing of humans. It thus integrates human beings completely because they are involved from the outset in the process of producing wealth and, at the end, in its use. There is increasing talk of sustainable development. Sustainable development is the rational management of human, natural and economic resources to meet the basic needs of humanity. There are conditions linked to sustainable development, including: maintaining general harmony, respecting the environment, preventing the depletion of natural resources, reducing waste production and finally, rationalizing the production and consumption of energy. The concept of sustainable development arose from two findings: the North/South divide and the search for human development, as well as the ecological crisis, accompanied by the urgent need of protecting the environment. The following section reviews social, human and environmental developments in the sub region.

### 3.1. Social Development

Social development may be understood to mean a participatory process of social production. It is built up with the greatest possible number of stakeholders within a given territory (population, institutions, public authorities, economic stakeholders), around a negotiated strategy for a sustainable social improvement and promotion project. It includes the development of human capital and knowledge, and proceeds in tandem with economic development. The most recent studies underscore the fundamental importance of education, research and innovation as factors for growth. Consequently, the issue of the link between social development and economic development is all the more relevant.

The only way to defeat poverty is by developing human capital. The importance of social capital in this regard is well recognised. Indeed, the literature of development economics accords considerable importance to investment in human capital (education and health). Human capital plays a crucial role in development. The American economist Théodore Schlut<sup>3</sup>, winner of a Nobel Prize in economics in 1979, has demonstrated that human capital represents a crucial factor that contributes to guaranteeing economic and social progress in a country. This is because it is humans that are the main creators of wealth through their knowledge and innovative capacity. For this reason, the higher a country's human capital, the higher its development level which is not necessary reflected in the Gross Domestic Product.

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<sup>3</sup> 1979 Nobel Prize: Sir Arthur Lewis (UK) and Theodore Schultz (U.S.) for their work on development economics with special focus on the importance of Human capital, progress and development.

One of the major objectives of the poverty reduction strategic frameworks (PRSF) is therefore to provide primary education and healthcare for all. In corroboration of this fact, virtually all the African countries, including those of West Africa, place a premium on social development, knowing that there can be no sustainable economic development without human development. Human beings, in fact, are at both the beginning and end of the social development process. The objective pursued therefore is reduction of the disparity between the standard of living of the poor and the rich, and between the towns and cities and the rural areas.

Poverty reduction through education necessarily demands the prior realisation of a certain number of objectives such as parity in the chances of access to education, and literacy of unschooled population groups in order to enable them to participate more effectively in the socio-economic life of the country. In the light of the preceding, it is clear that education is key to human development and poverty reduction. All West African countries have given this viewpoint on education absolute priority. In concrete terms, all the countries facilitate the access of girls to schools, and work towards the reduction of boy-girl disparity.

With reference to health in the West African countries, it is not, on the whole, as good as it is in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Although statistics on the health of the poor are difficult to come by, there appears to be a strong correlation between poverty and disease. The diseases endemic to West Africa are numerous, and include malaria, cholera, dysentery, yellow fever, and AIDS. However, the diseases which continue to ravage the sub-region are most certainly malaria, tuberculosis and AIDS.

With regard to improvement of the health of the individual, the target set by the West African countries is to reduce, and indeed totally eradicate endemic diseases. This involves reversal of the trend in those diseases which severely undermine human capital, and by their morbidity, diminish the capacity to work, namely malaria and AIDS.

According to UNAIDS (2007) in December 2006 the number of persons living with HIV worldwide was 39.5 million (37.2 million adults, 11.7 million women, and 2.3 million children under the age of 15). The number of AIDS-related deaths in 2006 was 2.9 million (2.6 million adults, and 380,000 children under the age of 15). The number of new cases of infection in 2006 was 4.3 million (3.8 million adults and 530,000 children under the age of 15). In short, the scope of the disease is vast and its destructive capability enormous. The situation in sub-Saharan Africa is as shown Tables 6 and 7.

Table 6: HIV and AIDS Statistics in Africa at the End of 2006, Compared to the Rest of the World

Region	Adults (>15 yrs) and Children Living with HIV	Adults (>15 years) and Children: New HIV Infections	Prevalence among Adults (15–49 yrs) (%)	Adults (>15 years) and Children: AIDS –induced Deaths	Number of Orphans
Sub-Saharan Africa	24.7 millions	2.8 millions	5.9	2.1 millions	12 millions
World	39.5 millions	4.3 millions	1.0	2.9 millions	15 millions
Share of Africa	63%	65%		72%	80%

Source: UNAIDS (2010)

Sub-Saharan Africa remains the most severely affected region of the world (65%), with nearly 25 million persons living with HIV, 2 million of whom are children under the age of 15. In 2006 alone, nearly 8,000 adults and children died daily from AIDS. The scourge has spared no country in West Africa or anywhere else on the continent. The prevalence rate varies from country to country. All the same, the rate today is low in other countries thanks to the actions taken to curb the spread of the pandemic. The prevalence of AIDS, which was particularly high in Côte d’Ivoire (10%) is coming down. According to UNAIDS, in 2010, about 750,000 persons, or 4.7% of the population, were living with HIV-AIDS in Côte d’Ivoire. In Burkina Faso it was 6%, and should approach 1.1% by 2015. The rate is 5% in Nigeria, where in this country alone, 2.5 million persons have been infected.

Care delivery to the sick eats into resources and reduces the production capacity of the household concerned, creating a vicious circle of impoverishment and reduction of agricultural revenue. Numerous cases of declining speculative or subsistence crop production have been observed in West Africa, particularly market gardening in Burkina Faso and cotton and cocoa farming in Côte d’Ivoire. According to FAO’s economic report (2007), the critical impact of HIV/AIDS will directly hit Africa’s agricultural production capacity by 2020.

Table 7: Status of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic according to Region

Region	Contamination Level per Adult (15–49 years)	Total Number of AIDS Infected Cases (0–49)	AIDS-induced Deaths in 2004
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.4%	25.4 millions	2.3 millions
North America	0.6%	1.0m	16 000
Western Europe	0.3%	570 000	16 000

Source: Regional comparisons of AIDS, UNAIDS, 2010)

Although the figures in the table portray sub-Sahara in a particularly tragic situation, it must be said that the AIDS pandemic is especially widespread in the southern part of the continent. Southern Africa is the region which has been most severely affected by the epidemic, with four countries registering infection rates of over 30%: Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and more than 10% adult infection levels in more than ten countries. In West Africa, some countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria

have infection rates of more than 5%. Despite these high levels of AIDS prevalence there is an important fact to be borne in mind which heightens the risk linked to the pandemic, which is that in many sub-Saharan countries “the general spread of the epidemic has only just begun”. In other words, if great care is not taken, in terms of both prevention and treatment, the number of AIDS-related deaths will inexorably continue to rise. Whatever the case, AIDS continues to kill too many children and women in West Africa. This is why so many non-governmental associations and organizations have been set up to help people overcome the scourge. At present, the main problem is the inaccessibility of drugs.

More than 30 years after the first cases of AIDS were identified, some African countries, including some in West Africa, have proved that it is possible to reduce infection levels. These are the countries which have combined prevention, care and treatment, and reinforced national control strategies against the pandemic.

One of the most important meetings on HIV/AIDS control in the sub-region was held in Dakar on 24 May 2010. Experts from a dozen countries considered ways in which to improve legislation on responsibility for issues relating to the control of the pandemic. The meeting, which was organised by UNAIDS, was intended to encourage countries like Ghana and Nigeria, among others, to create a legal framework governing issues relating to AIDS control. The experts attending the meeting established a correlation between the existence of legislation and progress in the control of the pandemic.

The incidence of AIDS on economic indicators and on growth is enormous. The economic growth of a country usually correlates with life expectancy, and 0.5% of economic growth is said to be gained for every five years added on to life expectancy. With life expectancy in Africa at 49 years, it does not look as if economic growth will be easy. In addition, it is very difficult to put exact figures to the economic consequences of a given disease on the development of a region. The Macroeconomics and Health Commission of the Global Economic Forum attempts to do just that: AIDS apparently costs the whole of the African continent between 11.7% and 35.1% of annual GDP.

Malaria is a global public health problem which is devastating in its consequences. More than one million people die from malaria in Africa every year. Children under five years of age and pregnant women are the most vulnerable to this disease. In response to this situation, the West African countries have launched a vast anti-malaria campaign.

The meeting of the Heads of State of the sub-region on malaria which was held in Abuja in 2010 was followed by a meeting of Members of Parliament, the civil society, research workers and representatives of international institutions involved in the

eradication of malaria, held in Bamako, within the framework of the anti-malaria campaign. It was observed that the practical measures involved in the intensification of the anti-malaria campaign in West Africa included the distribution of massive numbers of treated mosquito nets, intra-domiciliary spraying, and the treatment and proper care giving to malaria victims. These measures reduced the number of malaria-induced deaths by 60%.

The Roll Back Malaria partnership guaranteed a 50% approval level for grant applications worldwide and 80% approval for 19 African countries. The initiative falls within the framework of the 7<sup>th</sup> financing round of the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. The partnership, which is based in Geneva, made this announcement in a press release on the eve of Africa Malaria Day, 25 April 2007.

The partnership stated that anti-malarial drugs were an essential component of malaria control, in combination with preventive measures such as insecticide treated mosquito nets and spraying. It further stated that the effectiveness of the new drugs and preventive methods and the increase in allocated funding would enable the number of deaths caused by malaria to be halved worldwide by 2015. To date, the Global Fund has allocated 650 million USD which have paid for the distribution of 18 million mosquito nets and the treatment of 23 million cases of malaria, especially through artemisinin combination therapy (ACT), which is the most effective anti-malarial treatment currently available.

### 3.2. Environmental Development

Environmental issues, taken in combination with economic and social issues, constitute the three pillars of sustainable development<sup>4</sup>, and the central axis of the development policies formulated by partners and decision-makers.

The capital cities of the West African countries are experiencing the effects of population explosion (Lagos, 12 million inhabitants, Abidjan, Dakar and Bamako, more than 3 million each), and an exponential increase in the number of used vehicles imported from Europe, which are no longer compliant with required anti-pollution standards. A further example in advocacy of the environmental ethic in West Africa would be the events surrounding the dumping of toxic waste in Côte d'Ivoire in 2006. In August of the same year, part of the population of Abidjan came down with unidentified symptoms; the first toxic gas emissions invaded the city and an

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<sup>4</sup> The concept of sustainable development is contained in full in Agenda 21 (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992): "Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature".

overwhelmingly nauseous, suffocating stench announced the presence of toxic waste from the Russian vessel - "Probo Koala".

The prospect of other, even more dreadful environmental consequences lies ahead: contamination of the water table and the food chain, accompanied by medium- or long-term health repercussions. Respiratory diseases are on the increase in West Africa. Public health delivery costs are exorbitant and difficult to bear by these poor countries which are facing many other expenses inherent to the proper management of their human resource capital, particularly in the areas of education and training.

An in-depth understanding and analysis of the environmental issues facing West Africa and of the expenditure involved is mandatory in order to more effectively redefine development policies. The problem of climate change must also be taken into account in the economic development policies of the African countries, already greatly weakened by the effects of the crisis. Global warming is rising and disrupting ecosystems, thereby further complicating the situation of countries which are yet to resolve the problem of poverty. It is above all necessary to adopt measures to check pollution, depletion of natural resources, the greenhouse effect, climate change, deforestation, and the decline in biodiversity in order to safeguard environmental balance.

The status report on the environment in West Africa presents an integrated analysis of the environment in the West African sub-region. It provides a detailed evaluation of the current status of the environment, highlighting the pressures being exerted upon different areas of the environment, and the potential impact of these pressures on both environment and human beings. In Africa, environmental constraints are an impediment to growth. The Bamako and Abidjan Conventions mark an important step towards the formulation of an African environmental code.

The Bamako Convention on the ban on the Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, or more simply put, the Bamako Convention, was adopted in 1991 and entered into force in 1998. It is an international convention inspired by and adding to the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, in order to adapt its provisions to the situation of the developing countries of Africa. The Convention bans the export to Africa of dangerous waste products, including radioactive waste, even for recycling purposes. Furthermore, it introduces information<sup>5</sup> and control procedures similar to those stipulated in the Basel Convention into the procedure for the trans-border transit of dangerous waste through Africa. The objective of the Bamako Convention is to protect the health of

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5 Les régimes de Transit et le Nouveau Système de Transit Informatisé, <<http://www.douane.gouv.fr/page.asp?id=345#1>>; et Charles W. Schmidt, « Unfair Trade e-Waste in Africa », <<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1440802/>>

the people and the environment of the African countries from the transit, dumping and handling of dangerous waste originating from other countries. The convention also seeks to improve and ensure the ecologically sound management of dangerous waste, and the cooperation of the African States involved.

The Abidjan Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region was informed by the need to adopt a regional approach for the prevention, reduction and control of the pollution of the marine and coastal waters and connected rivers of West and Central Africa. The Abidjan Convention is a regional legal framework agreement stipulating the cooperation actions at national and regional levels for the protection and valorisation of the marine and coastal areas of the West and Central African regions (presently including South Africa). The Convention further provides for scientific, technological collaboration (including exchange of information and expertise) for the identification and management of environmental issues (eg. pollution in cases of emergency).

The overall objectives of the Abidjan Convention are to; build national capacity with a view to assessing the value and threats to live marine resources and their ecological role in the ocean; and and strengthen regional coordinating mechanisms and develop an effective regional framework for action.

Specifically, the Conveention seeks to:

- create mechanisms to influence major development projects and programmes with a view to ensuring that biological diversity is taken into due account;
- support the development and promotion of healthy technologies, particularly as applied in human activities within the marine environment such as the catching of untargeted fish species, with a view to minimising their impact in terms of loss or reduction of biological diversity;
- conduct economic studies on the evaluation of the social benefits of conservation of biodiversity. This evaluation could be used in the creation of a system of environmental resources accounting practices or green accounts;
- build and improve capacity in the countries, within the framework of existing institutions, with a view to facilitating collaboration for the study, conservation and management of live marine resources, as a support measure for the introduction of the appropriate legal instruments and the different provisions of Agenda 21;
- build national capacity with a view to coordinating, supporting and articulating assistance to the countries for the assessment of the value and threats to live marine resources and their ecological role in the ocean;

- strengthen regional coordinating mechanisms, promote coordinated programmes at the national level and create an effective regional action framework;
- address the problems of the river basins and marine and coastal environment through the integrated management of catchment areas, focusing on the control of pollution from land sources, and the promotion of integrated coastal management;
- facilitate the protection of vital coastal habitats and live aquatic resources, and promote protected marine zones; and
- support the integrity of the ocean and its resources through surveillance and evaluation programmes.

The main objective of the environmental law, which is a recently-introduced legal discipline in the West African context, is to contribute to the highest possible degree of environmental protection, particularly through the imposition of regulatory measures governing human activities capable of creating a negative impact on the environment, or of sound natural resource management techniques.

However, a status report on the effectiveness of environmental law in West Africa reveals a paradox: the proliferation of environmental protection rules is countered by the ineffectiveness of their executing mechanisms. There is no doubt as to the will of the West African decision-makers to incorporate environmental issues into their development policies. The Bamako and Abidjan Conventions attest to the awareness and will to push towards the attainment of sustainable development. However, the cost implications attached to this burning issue are high, and a heavy burden for countries already weakened by numerous problems. As a result, the environmental issue is not perceived, in practical terms, as a priority issue. The heavy additional cost of mitigating the ecological disaster in Africa is estimated at between 5 and 10% of GDP. The mechanisms of the carbon fund which are capable, in theory, of generating billions of dollars for investment in the developing world, presently ignore Africa. Moreover, only a ludicrous amount of aid and loans for development (less than 1%) is specifically earmarked for adaptation measures to climate change, whereas the amount needed is ten times higher.

At the conclusion of this part of the report, there is every reason, in referring to the West African situation, to perceive the position of the global economic mechanism on the sub-region as ambiguous, and lending to controversial conclusions. On the one hand, there is outstanding progress, or at least, positive trends which give grounds for hope. On the other, poorly handled shocks undermine all efforts and complicate progress towards well-being. From this viewpoint there can be no doubt that the different countries of the sub-region have achieved genuine economic progress, which is a necessary condition for emerging from the crisis. Nor can there be any doubt



that they are faced with partly endogenous and partly exogenous factors which block progress.

The problem at this point is to determine whether the economic performances observed can, properly speaking, generate social development, pro-poor growth, or in other words, achieve a substantial level of poverty reduction in compliance with the millennium development goals (MDGs). In clear terms, the problem is to see whether by 2015, which is five years away, West Africa can become an emerging economic zone, or at least, whether the conditions permitting its take-off towards progress have been fulfilled.



## Chapter 4

# Economic and Social Outlook for West Africa in 2011

After the examination of the economic, social and environmental performance of the sub region, this Chapters uses the outcomes of the preceding analyses to predict the future economic outlook of the sub-region. The prediction uses recent data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Economic Outlook (AEO) in defining these predictions.

### 4.1. The Outlook

According to the African Economic Outlook (2010) the global economic crisis of 2007-2008 put an end to the period of relatively sustained development in Africa. Growth was reduced from an average rate of 6% between 2006 and 2008, to 2.5% in 2009. However, the AEO states that sub-Sahara Africa economies are expected to gradually resume growth from 2010 onwards. The average growth rate which was 4.5% in 2010 is expected to rise to 5.2% in 2011<sup>6</sup>.

The IMF forecasts for West Africa contained in the Regional Economic Outlook Report, 14<sup>th</sup> issue of 2010, indicated that production would rise by more than 4.5% in 2010, compared to 2% in 2009. The report forecasts that the outlook for 2011 and beyond to be promising, and projects a growth rate to accelerate to more than 5.5% in 2011. This prediction assumes that the global economic recovery continues uninterrupted and that, at domestic level, political stability is maintained and the financial systems are in balance. According to this IMF prediction, Africa's petroleum-producing countries like Nigeria are likely to attain growth levels of about 10%. After emerging from the crisis, the continent is posting better growth rates and this growth will be sustained by strengthened recovery in the West. The report further asserts that despite the firming mineral prices, the economic growth patterns in other natural resource-exporting countries (for example those producing gold, phosphate, uranium, bauxite, manganese) will depend on the global growth patterns. For some countries, growth will depend on internal factors. Samir Jahjah, the principal resident representative of the IMF in the DRC, says that no African country will post negative growth. However, the 2009 economic crisis took its toll. In particular, the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be slowed down by the crisis. This was due to falling incomes and rising unemployment. Also worthy of note is the fact that some macro-economic indicators grew worse.

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6 Unexpectedly, Africa might reach only 2.8 % of GDP in 2011 due to various crises (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Côte d'Ivoire), (UNECA, 2012, forthcoming).

The relative good health of the economies of the region cited by the IMF and their low level of integration into the global market of sub regional economies will ensure that the upward trend will be sustained. An analysis of budget execution in 2009 shows that 20 out of 29 of the low-income countries of the region increased expenditure on health and education, while, globally, the level of public expenditure on investment was maintained. Nevertheless, the report underscores that “although economic growth only fell moderately, the slowdown wrought long-lasting damage on the region.” Starting with the observation that more than a third of the countries of the region were isolated from the international capital markets, remaining dependent on official sources of external financing, the report recommends that these countries should carry out necessary reforms in order to release the productive potential of their economies (trade promotion and development of the financial sector, domestic savings as a support measure, improvement of governance, and strengthening of institutions in order to attract investment capital more sustainably). The IMF report maintains that in most of the countries of the sub-region, economic policy should prioritise medium-term development objectives, without losing sight of the demands of macroeconomic stability. In terms of budgetary policy this presupposes the need to place greater emphasis on the more traditional objectives which mainly involve the strengthening of the health and education systems and remedying of infrastructural inadequacies. Those countries whose budget deficit is untenable in the medium term need to create some room for maneuver. Finally, those countries whose production remains far below their potential should resort to budgetary policy in order to sustain short-term demand.

The IMF report further points out that growth in sub-Saharan Africa is mainly dependent on the retention of financing flows at the high levels recorded in recent times. If, on the contrary, the aversion to risk should continue to prevail, or if, for example, budgetary reform in Europe should bring about a substantial reduction in donor assistance, it is almost certain that the expected acceleration in GDP growth will be halted. In the light of such uncertainties the institution recommends policies which will support recovery. For example, it is vital to centre budgetary policy around medium-term financial considerations and debt viability rather than around short-term production stabilisation policies, as is presently the case. The IMF report expressed satisfaction at the resilience of the continent in the face of adversity during the two years of crisis.

## 4.2. Risks

The principal risk threatening the outlook for trends in the region is a loss of momentum in the global economic recovery. However, the risk is not the same for all countries. For the petroleum-exporting countries, the consequences of a global slowdown will mainly be felt through its impact on oil prices (the case of Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire).

For the low-income countries on the other hand, the risk resides in the level of their exports to Europe, which represent about a third of their total exports, and nearly four times as much as their exports to the United States. Outside of these trade relations, the continuing weakness of the advanced countries and the remedial measures taken to reduce budget deficits are likely to affect the West African countries through reductions in aid and private financial flows to the region. Remittances of funds from diaspora constitute a substantial source of foreign exchange for some countries, representing, for example, 10% of GDP in Senegal, and exceeding international public aid in Mali. They are at risk of being affected by weakening economic conditions in countries that employ migrant workers from these countries.

Regarding the consequences of the global economic crisis in Africa, Samir Jahjah welcomed the fact that it failed to reduce spending in priority sectors (health, education, investments, etc.). The composition of the expenditure in most countries has remained focused on support to growth and poverty reduction. However, spending withstood the crisis, but revenues declined. This resulted in widening public deficits. The deficit is projected to remain high in 2011. International currency exchange reserve levels fell during the crisis. It became necessary to maintain high levels of international reserves in order to mitigate the effects of shocks. The States which were able to resist the crisis most successfully were those with high levels of international reserves.

Samir Jahjah emphasized that the IMF was there to respond to the crisis, making available to Africa concessional resources. Within this framework, amongst others, the DRC received 200 million USD in March 2009 under the Exogenous Shocks Facility. This was supposed to result in quite rapid recovery, driven by consumption and private investments. After the crisis, Samir Jahjah said, the priority should be the accumulation of exchange reserves and the reduction of public deficits.

Notwithstanding, risks continue to militate against growth in Africa, especially as a result of budgetary contractions in the advanced economies, which will affect the amounts allocated for aid to development. The African countries need to seek other sources of development financing. The weakness of growth in the advanced countries also constitutes a risk, even if growth is strong in the emerging countries. Over 50% of Africa's trade is with developed countries and hence any weak growth in these countries will adversely impact on African exports. Africa's exports to developed countries will decline. The continent will also experience a reduction in transfers from diaspora.

Nonetheless, foreign private investments will remain stable according to the IMF. Capital flows to Africa will be higher in 2011 than in 2010. The IMF is optimistic about political stability in Africa and emphasizes its importance in economic growth. Seventeen out of forty-four countries on the continent plan to hold elections in 2011. However, while the 2011 elections are a source of stability, they also involve expenditure. They constitute a high-risk factor at the regional level.

## Conclusion

The growth experienced in ECOWAS is expected to continue as the world completely recovers from the crisis. A combination of factors such as increasing domestic spending, rising investment flows from emerging countries in particular China will offset expected decline in international capital flows from traditional sources. A growing middle-class will boost consumer spending and so will the coming on stream of new mineral projects and the development of infrastructure.

The sub region needs to address its structural constraints, especially on the supply side, to low productivity in the primary sector, which is mainly dominated by subsistence agriculture, which is the mainstay of the majority of the population, and highly dependent on rainfall patterns in order to propel growth. Industrial development should be at the core of the sub region's development strategy. It should be focused on local linkages and value addition, particularly from the agricultural sector. The strengthening intra-regional trade should be prioritized by the sub region.

## PART II

# A Decade of Implementing the Mdgs in West Africa: Achievements and Shortfalls

## Overview

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) define the strategic approaches and targets to reach by 2015 in efforts to reduce poverty. They express the will of the political decision-makers on a global scale to undertake more intense, organized, consensual and efficient development action that is capable of reducing poverty sustainably. The general objective is to reduce the incidence of extreme poverty by 2015. However, halving poverty in West Africa by 2015 is a gigantic task as there are immense challenges to overcome. Despite these challenges, member States are committed to putting in place mechanisms towards the overall objectives. Since 2000, the MDGs have become the reference development framework and alignment of sectoral policies and strategies to significantly reduce poverty. It defines strategic objectives and targets to be achieved by 2015. As discussed earlier in this report, although the overall objective is to reduce the incidence of poverty by 2015, the framework consists of eight millennium development goals.

Member States of ECOWAS have endeavoured to implement programmes towards the attainment of the MDGs. Yet the means deployed and the results obtained differ from one country to another due to various reasons. Material, financial and human resources committed to programmes differ. Further, the socio-economic and political challenges in the member States differ. For example, while some have been peaceful, some have endured political instability during the implementation of the MDGs. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire have endured conflict and this has inadvertently impacted on progress towards the MDGs. The report will show that some countries have undertaken institutional innovations with a view to stimulating growth and reaching the MDGs including specific initiatives such as the adoption of plans founded on the MDGs, the strengthening of coordination and harmonization of national policies as well as the implementation of new sectoral policies to promote the extension of social protection.

The following Chapters present a review of progress on each of the eight MDGs (on a target by target basis) for member States of ECOWAS. Annex 1 summarizes the data used in the analysis and Annex 2 shows the list of MDG indicators. The analysis identifies the sources of success, highlights the challenges and proposes measures to accelerate progress towards the MDGs. The unavailability of harmonized statistics in the reports presented by the countries, which have served as the main sources of data for the present analysis, creates problems in making direct comparisons. However, an attempt is made to make such cross-country comparisons where feasible using the data in Annex 1.




## Chapter 5

### MDG 1: Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty

#### 5.1. Target 1A: Reduce by half, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day

Out of the 15 countries of West Africa, nine have made progress in reducing poverty during the period from 1990-2008. Cape Verde, Benin, Senegal and Ghana have all managed to reduce poverty significantly on the order of 17 to 22 percentage points (Graph 11). In Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo the proportion of people living in poverty has increased during the same period. Togo has recorded an increase of more than 30 percentage points in the incidence of poverty between 1990 and 2008. Thus, with the exception of the four countries, Cape Verde, Ghana, Senegal and to a lesser extent Benin, most of the other countries in the sub-region may not achieve this objective unless more effort is exerted.

**Graph 11: Proportion of the population living below the poverty level in West African countries, in 1990, 2008 and the target set for 2015**



**Source:** National MDG progress reports


**Notes:** 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

## 5.2. Target 1B: Achieve full employment and decent work for all, including women and young people

The high levels of poverty mentioned in the preceding section have been the direct result of unemployment. With the exception of Burkina, Guinea, Benin and The Gambia, the ratio of employment/population is hardly more than 70% (Graph 12). Furthermore, these ratios mask quality of work issues as many of the poor are forced to work under inhumane conditions for survival (UNDP 2010).

Although the levels of unemployment in West Africa vary from country to country, it is more pronounced in urban areas, and heavily affects the young people of both sexes. The high population growth in the sub-region continues to increase the numbers of the unemployed. The population of West Africa is increasing at about 2.5 % per year. Migration from rural to urban areas accounts for the high levels of unemployment in the towns and cities. In combining unemployment and under-employment in the broad sense, which represents effective local realities, those who are unemployed or earning less than the Guaranteed Minimum Wage (GMW) represent nearly 80% of the active population in the sub-region.

**Graph 12: Employment/population ratio in West African countries in 2008**




Source: UNSD\_MDG\_2010

Notes: No data for Togo, Ghana and Cape Verde

### 5.3. Target 1C: Halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger between 1990 and 2015

Five countries have recorded notable progress in reducing malnutrition among children under five (Graph 13). Among them, three (Cape Verde, Benin and Ghana) have already reached the target set for 2015. In contrast, in four other countries (Niger, Guinea Conakry, Togo and Liberia), the proportion of children showing this form of malnutrition has increased during the period of 1990-2008. Nevertheless, if the current trends are maintained, most of these countries will manage to reach the target set for 2015 and West Africa should as a whole succeed in reducing by half the proportion of children under five years of age who are underweight.

**Graph 13: Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age in West African countries in 1990, 2008 and the target set for 2015**



**Source :** National MDGs Progress Reports and \* UNDS MDG\_2010 Country Data

**Notes:** 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

Although there is anecdotal evidence that poverty has declined marginally in West Africa, more remains to be done to achieve the 2015 targets. Generally, living conditions have improved and people have access to better quality food, housing, communication methods and health systems. Indeed, a positive trend in terms of growth rate of productivity of labour is emerging, some countries through increasing investment. Liberia and Sierra Leone have shown progress in increasing labour productivity. Efforts have also been made in terms of investment to increase the level of production of food crops. Although cereal deficits are not fully controlled, significant reduction of hunger can be observed in many cases. As noted in the report, Ghana has already achieved the target of reducing the proportion of people who suffer from hunger, while the rest of West Africa is on track to get there. This success has been attributed to good governance, sound macroeconomic policies, and increased investments in agriculture. However, the incidence of hunger has worsened particularly in countries emerging from conflict such as Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Further, the Sahel countries face the biggest challenge in eradicating hunger. However, the lack of sufficient data remains a major obstacle to properly assess the progress made by countries individually. The progress made in Ghana and Nigeria with respect to the halving the number of undernourished children has raised the sub-region prospects and as a result West Africa has made progress on this indicator and might meet the 2015 target. This is despite the challenges faced in Liberia, Sierra Leone and The Gambia, where the number has increased. Targeted and innovative programmes such as the debt relief gain in Nigeria, livelihood empowerment against poverty, capital grant and fertilizer subsidy to farmers (all in Ghana) have been instrumental in accelerating this progress.

## Chapter 6

### MDG 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education

#### 6.1. Target 2A: Between now and 2015, ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling


The region of West Africa has recorded important progress in primary education during the last few years. In effect, the net rate of primary enrolment has increased in nine countries between 2000 and 2008. The most significant increases are recorded in Niger and in Sierra Leone, with over 27 percentage points in eight years or a progression of more than 3 points per year. Despite these performances, these two countries remain at the low end of the scale by comparison with countries such as Nigeria and Cape Verde which, even though they have declined slightly during the same period, reached in 2008 exceptional levels of enrolment in the order of 89.6% and 91.7% respectively.

In Cape Verde, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Benin a decline in this indicator can be noticed during the same period (Graph 14). This should not however raise a great deal of concern since most of these countries had relatively high rates since 2000. Ultimately, if the current trends continue, it is probable that, with the exception of Liberia, the countries of West Africa will manage to reach this objective between now and 2015.

This performance of countries in universal primary education has not been accompanied by the quality of education as witnessed by the proportions of schoolchildren who complete primary school (Graph 15). In fact, outside of five countries (Ghana, The Gambia, Nigeria, Togo and Benin), the proportion of schoolchildren having begun the first year of primary school and those who finish primary school remains under the 60% mark.

This counter-performance in terms of the quality of educational systems in West Africa is also illustrated by the low rates of literacy of young adults (Graph 16). In fact, only Nigeria and Cape Verde have recorded rates higher than 80%. This situation remains much more of a concern for countries such as Ghana which recorded a net enrolment rate of 88.5% in 2008 of which more than 86% complete primary school but where up to 2005, 79% of young adults still cannot read or write.


**Graph 14: Net enrolment ratio in primary education in West African countries in 2000 and 2008**



**Sources:** National MDGs Progress Reports and \*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

**Notes:** 2000 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.


**Graph 15: Proportion of schoolchildren starting the first year of primary school who complete primary school in West Africa**



**Source:** National MDGs Progress Reports and \*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

**Notes:** No data for Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau

**Graph 16: Literacy rate among 15-24 year-olds, women and men, in ECOWAS countries**



**Source:** National MDGs Progress Reports, \* UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Estimated and \*\*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

Overall, the analysis has shown that West African countries continue to make progress in the framework of the net enrolment rate in primary education and the literacy rate. International aid has played a pivotal role in increasing spending on primary education. However, the analysis has shown that despite the increase in enrolment, the completion rate for primary schools is still very low. Children drop out of school before completion due to challenges related to the cost of education. Nigeria and The Gambia have adopted non-traditional primary education models to boost education delivery at primary level and these have had positive effects on enrollment. Burkina Faso's Burkinabe Responses to Improve Girls Chances to Succeed (BRIGHT) programme is now in its second phase and positive outcomes are expected in the medium- to long-term.





## Chapter 7


### MDG 3: Promote Gender Equality and Women Empowerment

#### 7.1. Target 3A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and at all levels by 2015

All the countries of West Africa except for Nigeria made progress between 2000 and 2008 in terms of girls' primary enrolment (Graph 17). Two of them (Senegal and The Gambia) have already reached the objective of 100 girls for 100 boys by 2015, and in 2008 all the countries (except Niger) already had ratios of at least 0.8. These results demonstrate that as a whole, if the current trends are maintained, the West African sub-region should reach parity between girls and boys in primary school from now until 2015.

On secondary and higher education, the countries supply very little consistent information with regards to this indicator. Nevertheless, according to available data, the same trend can be observed in secondary school education although fewer countries have recorded very high ratios. In fact countries such as Ghana, Togo, Cape Verde and The Gambia with ratios of over 94 girls for 100 boys, have almost reached the 2015 target (Graph 18). The lowest ratios are to be found in the two Guineas; however, for Guinea Bissau, the most recent data dates from 2000.


**Graph 17: Ratio of girls/boys in primary schools in ECOWAS countries between 2000 and 2008**



**Sources:** National MDGs Progress Reports and \* UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

**Notes:** 2000 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

**Graph 18: Ratio of girls/boys in secondary schools, in West African countries**




**Source:** UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

**Note:** No data available for two countries

Concerning other aspects of gender, in contrast, the countries of the sub-region show very modest results. For instance, regarding employment, the gaps between men and women remain enormous in favor of men. According to the available data up to 2008, in nine out of the 15 countries, the proportion of wage-earning women in the non-agricultural sector remains less than 30% (Graph 19). The countries that recorded the highest rates are Togo and Cape Verde with 40% and 38.9% respectively. In four countries (Senegal, Liberia, Burkina and Guinea Bissau), this proportion remains very low at around 10%.


In terms of politics, the number of seats held by women in parliament remains less than 25% of those held by men in all countries (Graph 20). Only Senegal (22.7%), Guinea (19.3%) and Cape Verde (18.1%) record proportions in the order of 20 women out 100 representatives.

**Graph 19: Proportion of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector in ECOWAS countries**



Sources: \* UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data and \*\*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Estimated

**Graph 20: Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments in 2010 ECOWAS countries**



**Source:** UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

Thus, ECOWAS member States have generally made progress in the field of gender equality and empowerment of women. The data have shown that the target of gender parity in primary education should be achieved by most countries. In this respect, countries such as The Gambia, Guinea, Mali and Senegal have made the greatest progress. Unfortunately, the parity falls in secondary education and the gap widens even more in higher education. Another indicator of increasing gender equality and empowerment is the general rise in the proportion of women elected to national parliaments in West Africa. Yet other analysts continue to emphasize that empowerment and equality should not sacrifice quality, these women officials should be able to contribute effectively to policy formulation.

## Chapter 8

### MDG 4: Reduce the Mortality of Children under Five


#### 8.1. Target 4A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the mortality rate among children under five years of age

During the period from 1990 to 2006, only two countries (Nigeria and Sierra Leone) did not record a decrease in the mortality rate of children under five years (Graph 21). Among the 13 others that recorded decreases in mortality rates, it is above all in Niger (-120 points) and Liberia (-109 points) where these decreases are considerable. However, in spite of these good performances, taking into consideration the very high levels of this indicator in 1990, these two countries are today very far from reaching their targets. Apart from Cape Verde which is 6.7 points within reach of the target for 2015, all the other countries are more than 20 percentage points from their targets. This means that this objective in 2015 will remain out of reach for the West African sub-region if the current trend is maintained.

This same trend is also observed concerning infant mortality, with decreases varying from 9 points (The Gambia) to 51 points (Guinea). In only one country (Nigeria) has the situation of children worsened with an increase of 19 points during the period from 1990 to 2006. In terms of reaching the objective, with the exception of Cape Verde and Ghana which are within 7.7 and 16 points respectively of the target set for 2015, all the other countries remain more than 30 points from the target set (Graph 22).

Concerning the vaccination of children against measles, only Togo (-4.6 points) has not recorded an improvement in the rates during the period from 1990-2008 (Graph 23). The highest proportions of vaccinated children are observed in Burkina Faso (97.6%), Cape Verde (96%) and Gambia (91%). The lowest rates are observed in Sierra Leone (40%), in Niger (52%) and in Guinea Bissau (55%).


**Graph 21: Mortality rate of children under five years old in West African countries in 1990, 2006 and the target set for 2015**



Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports

Notes: 1990 and/or 2006 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.


**Graph 22: Infant mortality rate in West African countries, in 1990, 2006 and the target set for 2015**



Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports

Notes: 1990 and/or 2006 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available

**Graph 23: Proportion of 1 year-old children vaccinated against measles in West African countries in 1990 and 2008**



**Sources :** National MDGs Progress Reports and \* UNDS\_MDG\_2010 Estimated

**Notes:** 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

The sub-region continues to make progress, albeit very slow, on reducing mortality among children under five. If the current trend continues, the West African countries will most likely not achieve the objective of reducing the mortality rate of children under five by 2015. Although countries like Ghana have made progress, access to health services for preventable diseases remains a major challenge especially among the rural communities and hence the high mortality rate.





## Chapter 9


### MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health

#### 9.1. Target 5A: Reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio

Maternal mortality remains the indicator of most concern in West Africa in spite of the remarkable efforts noted in certain countries which have managed to lower the rate significantly (Graph 24). Indeed, although certain countries have advanced in this area, the situation has further declined in the other countries. While countries such as Sierra Leone (-943 points) and Nigeria (-600) have brought about a large decrease in the rate, certain countries such as Liberia (+734 points) and Guinea (+314 points) have in contrast seen their situations worsen. In terms of reaching this objective, no country in the sub-region can claim to be able to reach this target in 2015. In effect, the countries that are closest to their targets for 2015 are currently within 147 points (Ghana) and 165 points (Burkina). Guinea and Liberia are 813.5 and 929 points within their targets in 2015.

These high rates of maternal mortality are the reflection of the low proportions of births assisted by qualified health personnel, in spite of the high rates of pre-natal consultations observed as a whole (Graph 28) in these countries. With the exception of Cape Verde (77.5%) and Benin (78%), all the countries remain under the mark of 70% of assisted births (Graph 25). Countries such as Niger (17.9%) and Guinea Bissau (27%) remained at very low levels in 2008.


**Graph 24: Maternal mortality rates in West African countries in 1990, 2008 and the target set for 2015**



**Sources:** National MDGs Progress Reports and \*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Modelled

**Notes:** 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

**Graph 25: Proportion of births assisted by qualified health personnel in 1990 and 2008**



**Sources:** National MDGs Progress Reports and \* UNSD\_MDG\_2010


**Notes:** 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

## 9.2. Target 5B: Achieve universal access to reproductive health by 2015

According to available data, contraception is practiced very little by West African women with rates lower than 24% in 14 out of the 15 countries (Graph 26). In effect, only Cape Verde reached a rate of 61.3% in 2005. In spite of these low rates, the unmet needs in terms of family planning are not great (Graph 29). They remain under the bar of 36% in the whole of the West African sub-region. This means that countries are confronted much more with problems of demand than supply of services and must consequently orient their efforts towards the creating a demand for family planning services.


The birth rate among young women aged 15 to 19 years also remains very high, at levels higher than 100 per thousand in 11 out of the 15 countries (Graph 27). Only Senegal (96%), Cape Verde (92%), Togo (88.6%) and Ghana (70%) have recorded relatively low rates.

**Graph 26: Contraceptive prevalence rate**




Source: UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

**Graph 27: Adolescent birth rate**




Source: UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

**Graph 28: Prenatal care coverage (at least one visit) in ECOWAS countries**



Source: UNSD\_MDG\_2010

**Graph 29: Unmet needs for family planning in ECOWAS countries**



Source: UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

Note: Data not available for The Gambia and Guinea Bissau

The analysis showed that the maternal mortality rate is below the objective set. Although significant improvements were recorded in respect of births attended by skilled health personnel in some countries, the mortality rate remains high. On the rate of contraceptive prevalence, it is clear that most West African countries are unlikely to reach the target. The birth rate among teenagers is the highest in Niger and Mali. Further, although the coverage of antenatal care is improving, it is still low compared to other developing regions and at its current levels the MDG goals will not be met.

## Chapter 10


### MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other Diseases

#### 10.1. Target 6A: By 2015, halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

With regards to HIV/AIDS, countries supply very little comparable data for the age range concerned (15-24 years). However, according to the data available for some countries, the phenomenon is less serious by comparison with other sub-regions of Africa (Graph 30). In fact, most countries have managed to stop the pandemic or indeed reverse the trend. The case of most concern is that of Nigeria where large disparities exist among the different States.

Access to treatment with antiretroviral treatment remains, however, very low for HIV patients (Graph 31), as only three countries (Senegal, Benin and Mali) have managed to provide these recommended treatments to more than 40% of patients in advanced stages of the disease.


**Graph 30: HIV prevalence rate among the population aged 15-24 years in 2000 and 2008**



**Sources:** National MDGs Progress Reports

**Notes:** 2000 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

**Graph 31: Proportion of the population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral medications in 2007**




**Source:** UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Adjusted

As for malaria and tuberculosis (Graph 32), they continue to be of major concern for the governments of West African countries. For malaria, seven countries (Niger, Mali, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Burkina Faso) show particularly alarming situations with specific mortality rates of over 100 deaths per 100,000 cases. Concerning tuberculosis, it is in Sierra Leone that the highest mortality rate (140 per 100,000) is observed. Certain countries such as Benin (15 per 100,000) and Guinea Bissau (25 per 100,000) have managed to considerably reduce the death rate due to tuberculosis.



**Graph 32: Mortality rate associated with malaria and tuberculosis in 2008**



Source: \*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Modelled and- \*\*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Estimated

Notes: No data for Cape Verde

The data show that progress registered so far is not sufficient to achieve the goal by 2015, even in the absence of HIV and AIDS. Mali, Togo, Sierra Leone and Senegal are on target on the HIV and AIDS target. The rate of HIV prevalence and mortality recorded in 2007 continue to decline, even for the very vulnerable age group of 15 to 24 years. On the other hand, the proportion of people with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs has declined. This has led to a decline in mortality due to HIV/AIDS. With regard to malaria, a decline in mortality from this pandemic was recorded in a number of countries in the sub-region. However, progress in the development of a malaria vaccine is the best hope for reducing the incidence of malaria, but there is not any now. The prevalence of tuberculosis is increasing steadily since 1990 in a number of countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo and Sierra Leone. It declined steadily in Nigeria from 2003 to 2007.




## Chapter 11

### MDG 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability

#### 11.1. Target 7C: Reduce by half in 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation

The situation of the West African people with regards to access to drinking water is satisfactory overall if we consider the available data in 2008 (Graph 33). In effect, in nine out of the 15 countries, the proportion of the population with access to drinking water is higher than 60%. Among them, three (The Gambia, Ghana and Cape Verde) are practically certain to reach this objective between now and 2015. Only three countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Niger) have recorded relatively low rates. However, if the trends observed during the period from 1990-2008 are maintained, it can be hoped that this objective will be within reach for the whole sub-region.

**Graph 33: Proportion of the population using an improved drinking water source**




Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports and \*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Estimated

In spite of the fact that most of the countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> have continued to rise in several countries. In the sub-region, four countries (Nigeria, Cape Verde, Benin and Ghana) stand out clearly (Graph 34). The cases of Nigeria and Cape Verde seem to be of most concern with record levels of CO<sub>2</sub> emission per inhabitant. If the case of Nigeria as the largest economy of the sub-region can be explained, this is not so for Cape Verde. Indeed, 90% of carbon dioxide emissions are considered to originate from the burning of fossil fuels (petroleum products, charcoal, natural gas) and are therefore directly related to the consumption of energy.


It is to be remembered that the need to preserve the ozone layer led the developed countries to elaborate an international convention known as the “Vienna Convention” in 1985. This agreement was followed by the Montreal Protocol in 1987, the provisions of which aimed at the progressive abandonment of the production and consumption of substances that contribute to shrinking the ozone layer. The purpose of this indicator is to monitor the reduction in the consumption of substances that shrink the ozone layer. As shown by the available data in 2008 (Graph 35), apart from Nigeria, the consumption of these substances remains very low in all countries. The consumption by Nigeria alone represents more than 70% of the total consumption in the sub-region.

**Graph 34: Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> per inhabitant in 2007**



Source: UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Global Monitoring Data

**Graph 35: Consumption of ozone-depleting substances in 2008**



**Source:** UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

A study conducted by ECA in 2010 on MDG planning in fifteen African countries shows that many countries still need to incorporate environmental sustainability into their national development plans. The indicator on the proportion of protected areas showed improvements in recent years to countries such as Niger. However, the level and rate of deforestation remain a problem. The carbon dioxide emissions have declined in most African countries between 1990 and 2006. The water deficit to meet human and environmental needs is increasing and showed a lack of access to safe water and sanitation, especially in the ever-growing slums in the sub-region. The negative consequences of climate change certainly impede progress towards the MDGs in Africa.




## Chapter 12

### MDG 8: Set Up a Global Partnership for Development

12.1. Target 8D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term

It is to be noted that in countries for which data is available, this indicator was declining in all the countries between 1990 and 2008 (Graph 36). For five out of the seven countries that provided data on this indicator in their different MDGs progress reports, the decline ranged from 12 (Guinea) to 38 (Côte d'Ivoire) percentage points during the period.

**Graph 36: Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services in West African countries in 1990 and 2008**



**Source:** National MDGs Progress Reports

**Notes:** 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

## 12.2. Target 8F: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications for all

In spite of the progress achieved in all aspects of technology, in general very few Africans have access to ICT. With regards to internet, up to 2008 its use remained very limited in the sub-region. In effect, the number of users is hardly more than 21 per 100 inhabitants in all the countries (Graph 37). In ten countries, this figure remains under the mark of 10 users per 100 inhabitants.


Furthermore, the gap between those who have access and those who do not, commonly called the “digital divide” is very deep especially in the rural areas where the highest poverty rates are observed whereas according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2007 Report on the least-developed countries), a significant reduction in poverty in these countries must necessarily begin by filling this technological gap.

Concerning the mobile telephone, its use has grown much more rapidly. In effect, according to a report of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) published in 2008, the annual growth of the number of mobile phone subscribers in Africa is increasing faster than on any other continent. In West Africa in 2008 (Graph 38), seven countries have passed the mark of 40 subscribers per 100 inhabitants. The case of The Gambia is exceptional with more than 70 subscribers per 100 inhabitants. Some countries (Niger, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) remain slow however, with fewer than 20 subscribers per 100 inhabitants.

In general, this situation of ICT use in the sub-region is explained by the fact that the good political intentions shown by governments do not translate into action and in many countries the absence of a strategy in this area can be noted. Moreover, most tax regimes continue to consider the ICT as luxury products thus making them difficult to obtain by the majority of the population.




**Graph 37: Internet users per 100 inhabitants in 2008**



Source : UNSD\_MDG\_2010

**Graph 38: Cell phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants in 2008**



Source : UNSD\_MDG\_2010

Partnerships generally remained strong even during the 2008-2009 crisis. However, an area of concern for African countries remains the negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU). Moreover, the average tariffs applied by developed countries on imports from Africa have been declining

since 2000. Africa remains constrained by a limited commercial capacity, including a fragile physical and commercial infrastructure. Efforts to manage the debt problems of African countries are under progress on the best methodology for calculating debt sustainability. At this level, there is hope. The increasing use of ICT observed in the report points to progress towards strengthening communication and partnerships.

The foregoing analysis shows that, although generally behind on attaining some MDGs, West Africa has made some progress, albeit in only a few areas. In general many countries in the sub-region have made steady progress within the framework of all the MDGs despite the global food, energy, economic and financial crisis which reversed some of the gains previously made.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

Part II of this report has shown that West African countries have made significant progress towards the attainment of MDGs, particularly for certain indicators. For example, it is clear that the goals relative to primary education for all, the reduction of malnutrition among children under five years, parity between girls and boys in primary education, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis and access to drinkable water can be reached by 2015 by the majority of countries if efforts are maintained in all member States. However, further endeavours are necessary to accelerate and sustain the progress, particularly in the areas of poverty reduction and child and maternal health.

In terms of poverty reduction, the progress accomplished is low, and characterized by enormous disparities among the different member States. The slow pace of reducing poverty indicates that the sub-region cannot reach this objective by 2015. The main problem remains the insufficient investment in agriculture, which constitutes the main source of income for rural populations who often do not have the means to purchase the inputs for their crops in order to fully provide for the needs of their increasingly numerous families as a result of the high population growth rates.

Regarding maternal health since 1990 the mortality rate throughout the sub-region has fallen only slightly in several countries as a consequence of associated number of socio-cultural factors which have indeed contributed to maintain the related indicators at a very low level. The limited use of contraception and the low availability of skilled professional assistance at delivery continue to account for high mortality, especially in rural areas. Regarding the health of children, the achieved progress remains minimal in most countries in comparison with the expected results, and considering the very high levels of these indicators in 1990. This is still a big challenge for the sub-region.

Political instability and tension, high levels of corruption, low investment and climate change all continue to undermine progress towards MDGs. The attainment of the MDGs for West Africa is still facing obstacles such as inadequate resources, poor governance, corruption, and armed conflict.

In order to accelerate progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, member States should:

- Mobilize the financial, material and human resources required for the implementation of the MDGs;
- Create and sustain a powerful and effective agricultural sector, in order to enhance the level of production and productivity. This requires increased investment (FDI and domestic financing) to reduce hunger, and also move towards food self-sufficiency;

- Build the capacity of the private sector that can contribute effectively to development, and generate sufficient revenues for the entire social body. Emphasis should be placed on developing the industrial sector with special focus on the productive capacity and the mastering of the value chain starting in the agro-food sector. It has the ability to lead the rest of the economy to ensure growth and generate decent jobs;
- Strengthen the competitiveness of local enterprises to survive the impacts of globalization and increased international competition;
- Consolidate MDGs monitoring to implement programmes which are the reference framework for all development policies;
- Re-direct investments into priority productive sectors including value addition;
- Decentralize the health sector, hire more staff, and improve access to clinics, hospitals and other health facilities in rural areas; and
- Invest in maintaining peace and stability and work towards lasting peace as a precondition for investment and hence development.

The national level efforts should be complemented by a sub-regional approach to address some of the challenges. In that regard, the ECOWAS Commission should:

- Develop programmes and approaches to mitigate the adverse impacts of climate change and collaborate with international partners to ameliorate the impact of these natural disasters;
- Ensure that peace and security prevails in the sub-region through strengthening the mechanisms for monitoring and also encouraging member States to accede to APRM;
- Intensify intra-community trade, based on complementary economies of the sub-region, and create domestic and regional markets through trade policies and infrastructure investments;
- Create an environment to increase the production and processing of agricultural products in order to meet a growing domestic and regional demand;
- Facilitate the sharing of experiences on successful programmes towards the implementation of MDGs and explore the possibility of large scale replication region-wide and in that way consolidate the common regional vision on accelerating MDGs implementation; and
- Help strengthen the statistical capacities of member States to ensure regular production, analysis, dissemination and harmonized national statistics as part of a regional planning tool with special focus on wealth creation, inequality and MDGs.

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## Others references on MDGs at national levels:

### Benin

- MDGs Progress Report, July 2009
- Special Assessment Report on the Implementation of the MDGs, October 2010

### Burkina Faso

- MDGs Progress Report, December 2003
- MDGs Progress Report, May 2010

### Cape Verde

- MDGs Progress Report, 2004
- MDGs Progress Report, May 2009

### Côte d'Ivoire

- National Report on the MDGs, November 2003
- Progress Report on the Millennium Goals for Development, July 2010

### Gambia

- MDGs Progress Report, December 2003
- MDGs Progress Report, March 2005
- MDGs Progress Report, 2010

### Ghana

- MDGs Progress Report, 2007
- MDGs Progress Report, 2009

### Guinea Bissau

- MDGs Progress Report, 2004

### Guinea Conakry

- MDGs Progress Report, August 2007
- Assessment Report on Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in ECOWAS countries, July 2010

### Liberia

- MDGs Progress Report, September 2004
- MDGs Progress Report, September 2008

#### Mali

- MDGs Implementation Report, July 2010
- Report on progress in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), November 2004

#### Niger

- MDGs Progress Report, 2003
- MDGs Progress Report, 2007
- MDGs Progress Report, 2009
- MDGs Progress Report, 2010

#### Nigeria

- MDGs Progress Report, 2004
- MDGs Progress Report, 2007

#### Senegal

- MDGs Progress Report, August 2001
- MDGs Progress Report, September 2006
- Report on the status of the MDGs and strategic orientations for 2015, November 2009

#### Sierra Leone

- MDGs Progress Report, 2005

#### Togo

- MDGs Progress Report, October 2003
- MDGs Progress Report, April 2010
- UNSD\_MDG\_2010

## Annex 1: Tables

Table 8 : Proportion of the population living below the poverty line (%)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2001	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	Target 2015	
Benin	53											28.5			37.4	33.3		27	
Burkina Faso					44.5				45.3				46.4				43.1	22	
Cape Verde	49										36.7						26.6	24.5	
Côte d'Ivoire				32.3		36.8			33.6			38.4						48.9	16.2
The Gambia			31					69					58						15
Ghana			51.7							39.55					28.5				26
Guinea					62.6							49.2				53		31.3	
Guinea Bissau		49										64.7						24.5	
Liberia								55.1			76.2						63.8	27.5	
Mali	68										63.8				64.4			34.5	
Niger				63										62.1			59.5	31.5	
Nigeria			42.7				65.6										54.7	21.3	
Senegal					67.9	65					57.1			50.6				34	
Sierra Leone	70																62	35	
Togo	30					72.2									61.7			15	

Source: National MDGs Progress Reports. Country Data, 1990-2010

Notes: 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

Table 9: Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age (%)

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Target 2015
Benin	40				29					23				23				20
Burkina Faso					42.2			43				38	46.1		31.7			21.5
Cape Verde	16			14							6				4			8
Côte d'Ivoire			23.6	23.8			21.2				21.7			20.2		20.2		11.8
The Gambia					21				17					20.3				10.5
Ghana	27.4							24.9				22.1				13.9		13.7
Guinea								23							26.1			11.5
Guinea Bissau									22					15				
Liberia						14.8		6.8							18.8			7.4
Mali	42.9				43.3					33.0				27				21.45
Niger		36					49.5							44			33.7	18
Nigeria	35.7		28.3					30.7							25			17.85
Senegal					22.3				18.4				17.3					11
Sierra Leone													30			21		
Togo	18						25							26		20.5		9

Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports. UNSD\_MDG 2010 Country Data

Notes: 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

Table 10: Net enrolment ratio in primary education (%)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Benin				48.7											77.5	61.1		76.2
Burkina Faso							34.9											57.9
Cape Verde	71.5									96				95.8				91.7
Côte d'Ivoire				48.8		51.1		52.6		56.9		56.5						56.1
The Gambia	44	46.3			65			59.8		60	60	61	62	61	64	64	72	77
Ghana															69.2	81.1	83.7	88.5
Guinea											48	57	60	62	63	63	64	62
Guinea Bissau		23			25					41			57					
Liberia	32										34.7							37.3
Mali													46	57				61
Niger			18.2						28.9	32	35.7	39.8	44	44.8	45.9	48	53.5	58.6
Nigeria	68									95								89.6
Senegal											58			69.3	72.1			
Sierra Leone										42				64	69			
Togo	67					75.5				76.2						73.4		87

Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports and \* UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

Notes: 2000 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

Table 11: Literacy rate of 15-24 years, women and men (%)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Benin			30								48					60.5	
Burkina Faso					18.9		18.4					30.25		33		39.3	
Cape Verde	88.2								95								96
Côte d'Ivoire				58.4		60.7	60.1				58.9						52.8
The Gambia	48				48.2		47.5					62.9					
Ghana																	
Guinea Bissau									45.9								
Liberia	32.9									34.7							73.1
Mali		16.8				26				21	22.85	24	25.15	26.3	26.2		
Niger														36.5			35
Nigeria		70.7						64.1									81.4
Senegal							68.9		59		49.3			50.9			
Sierra Leone														25		56.8	
Togo	63.3					69.6			74					75			

Source: : National MDGs Progress Reports, \* UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Estimated and \*\*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

Table 12: Proportion of school children in the first year of primary school who complete primary school (%)

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Benin													65	65	66	61
Burkina Faso																41.7
Côte d'Ivoire	51.3		47.9		46.4	45.2		43.1		45				43.1		51.1
The Gambia		88				90		96.6						96.6		
Ghana													75.6	85.4	85.5	86.3
Guinea Bissau				46.9				44								
Liberia									31.2							
Mali											41.6					55.7
Niger							22.4	23.7	25.6	24.7	32.2	36	40	42.7	45.8	48.2
Nigeria	67							97							74	
Senegal									45			48.7	53.9		55.1	58.4

Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports and \* UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

Notes: 2000 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

Table 13: Ratio of girls to boys in primary school

Country	1990	1991	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2011	2015 target
Benin		0.51	0.67	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.74	0.77	0.8	0.83		0.87	0.88	1.24	1.00
Burkina Faso	0.62	0.64	0.7	0.71	0.73	0.74	0.75	0.79	0.8	0.82	0.84	0.87	0.89	1.03	1.00
Cape Verde		0.94	0.96	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.93		1.00
Cote d'Ivoire		0.71	0.74	0.75	0.76	0.74	0.8			0.79	0.79	0.79	0.81	0.85	1.00
Guinea	0.2	0.48	0.64	0.69	0.72	0.75	0.77	0.79	0.82	0.84	0.86	0.85	0.86	1.27	1.00
Guinea Bissau			0.67	0.67											1.00
The Gambia			0.85	0.87	0.9	0.9	0.97	1	1.02	1.04	1.04	1.06	1.04		1.00
Ghana	0.82	0.86	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.95	0.98	0.95	0.97	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.01	1.00
Liberia	0.65		0.74	0.72							0.91	0.9			1.00
Mali		0.59	0.71	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.76	0.77	0.78	0.8	0.81	0.83	0.84	1.01	1.00
Niger		0.6	0.68	0.69	0.69	0.7	0.71	0.71	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.78	0.8	0.93	1.00
Nigeria	0.76	0.79	0.8	0.8	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.84	0.85	0.88	0.85	0.88	0.90	1.00
Senegal		0.73	0.82	0.86	0.88	0.9	0.92	0.95	0.96	0.98	1	1.02	1.04	1.16	1.00
Sierra Leone		0.67		0.68											1.00
Togo	0.65	0.65	0.75	0.78	0.79	0.81	0.82	0.84	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.88	0.94	1.10	1.00

Source: Compiled from UNSD data (Updated in August , 2011 <http://mdg.un.org/un/mdg/Datas.aspx>)

Table 14: Proportion of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector (%)

	1990	1994	1996	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	Target 2015
Burkina Faso										40.8			50
Côte d'Ivoire				20			22.3						50
Guinea		10.7						27.1					50
Liberia	23					11.4		36					50
Niger									25.4	27.17	30.42	36.11	50
Nigeria	66.3		46		79								50
Senegal						21.6			26.5				50
Togo					6.1								50

Sources: \* UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data and \*\*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Estimated

Table 15: Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)

	1990	1991	1992	1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Benin				6.25				7						10	10	10
Burkina Faso			1.9		9.1					10.2				12.7		
Côte d'Ivoire		4.6		4.6		8			8.5						8.9	
Guinea													19.3	16.7		
Guinea Bissau	19.3			10				8								
Liberia	5.6								11.1					14		
Mali			3			12		12.2				10	10	10	10	10
Niger								1.2				12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4
Nigeria	1							3.1						7.7		
Senegal											19.2	19.2		22		
Togo	4			1				6								

Source: National MDGs Progress Reports, UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Country Data

Table 16: Mortality rate for children under five years of age (per one thousand)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Target 2015
Benin	195						167									125			65
Burkina Faso				187					127				183			142			62.3
Cape Verde	56										38.8						25.7		19
Côte d'Ivoire	150				150				181						125				50
The Gambia				137								135	99						46
Ghana	155								108					101		80			52
Guinea			229							176.9					163				76.3
Guinea Bissau	246									203						200			82
Liberia	220									194							111		73
Mali		238					242					241				191			79
Niger			318						274							198			106
Nigeria	191					176			119			183	217				201		63.7
Senegal			156.7	135				139.3			145.7				121				52
Sierra Leone	244									284				265				140	81
Togo	150								146							123			50

Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports

Notes: 1990 and/or 2006 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

Table 17: Infant mortality rate (per one thousand)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	Target 2015
Benin	105					90									75		35
Burkina Faso				107.6				105.3							91.7		35.8
Cape Verde	42									32.5						21.7	14
Côte d'Ivoire	97				89			112						84			32
The Gambia	84									66	64	61	75				28
Ghana	103							57							50		34
Guinea			136						108.3					84.5			45
Guinea Bissau	142								124						119		47
Liberia									117							72	39
Mali		123									113				96		41
Niger			123					123							81		41
Nigeria	91				195					81.38		75.1				110	30.3
Senegal			76	70		60	69.4		71.1	63.5				61			25
Sierra Leone	163																55
Togo	81							80							77		27

Source: National MDGs Progress Reports, UNSD\_MDG 2010 Country Data

Table 18: Proportion of 1 year-old children vaccinated against measles (%)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
Benin	50						64					68					60				
Burkina Faso	49.3										57.7		64							97.6	
Côte d'Ivoire	38				49				48.6					46		50	73	67			
The Gambia	89	87	83	87	89	91	94				92	89	93				92.4		91		
Ghana																				86.6	
Guinea			42							59.7						74.9					
Guinea Bissau	53				68					70			55								
Liberia	40										52	69		53					85		
Mali												49						68			
Niger	25		27.8						34.9									47		52.3	65.5
Nigeria	46										32.8		90.4						60		
Senegal			57													74					
Sierra Leone								28								52	63			40	
Togo	64.6										58									60	

Sources : National MDGs Progress Reports and \* UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Estimated

Notes: 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

Table 19: Maternal mortality rate (per one hundred thousand)

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1996	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Target 2015
Benin					498					474			397				125
Burkina Faso			566			484							307				142
Cape Verde		5			15.4			28.8			9			3.7			
Côte d'Ivoire							597					543					149
The Gambia	1050								730				556				263
Ghana				214	740								187	224	201	170	54
Guinea		666					528					980					166.5
Guinea Bissau	914				822							890					229
Liberia	260						578							994			65
Mali	577							582	582				464				144
Niger		652											648				175
Nigeria	1400						704		1500					800			350
Senegal		510										401					128
Sierra Leone	1800											495			857		450
Togo	640					478		570					490				160

Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports and \*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Modelled

Notes: 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.



Table 20: Proportion of births attended by qualified health personnel (%)

	1990	1992	1993	1994	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Benin	35							73				78			
Burkina Faso			41.5											62.7	
Côte d'Ivoire				45	47				51.9		55			56.8	
The Gambia	42						55					56.8		64.49	
Ghana												44.5	32.1	39.1	45.6
Guinea		30.5				34.8					38.4				
Guinea Bissau						18				27					
Liberia	91					89.1							46		
Mali								41		40		55			
Niger		14.9			17,6							17.9			34.4
Nigeria	45				31				42				36.3		
Senegal						48.7				56.7	51.9		62,5	61	
Sierra Leone	25														
Togo					49		72.9			61		62			

Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports and \*UNSD\_MDG\_2010

Notes: 1990 and/or 2008 unavailable data are either estimated or updated accordingly to country data available.

Table 21: Proportion of the population using an improved drinking water source (%)

	1990	1993	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Benin	50								57.8					63.6			
Burkina Faso											69.2						
Côte d'Ivoire		36.4								51.2						61	
The Gambia	69							84							85.1		87
Guinea			51							62			68.1		73.8		
Guinea Bissau										54		59					
Liberia					58.4		26					61			65		
Mali														78.5			
Niger													48.7		50.1		
Nigeria	54							57							49.1		
Senegal								72.7					70.4				
Sierra Leone												53	47				
Togo				55		52		48									

Sources: National MDGs Progress Reports and \*UNSD\_MDG\_2010 Estimated

Table 22: Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services (%)

	1990	1991	1993	1994	1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Benin	20															2.5	
Burkina Faso									27.8				15.8	10.6	8.1	6.3	5.5
Côte d'Ivoire			52.6		35.6		21.3	27.3	27.7	23.1	14.1						9.04
Guinea				28.5								21.5	21.1	19	16.2	15.9	
Nigeria		27.8				2.91		13.33			7.9						
Senegal									13.3			11.4		11.6			
Togo	17.1		30.9			11.8			18.2								

**Source:** National MDGs Progress Reports

**Notes:** For 1990, the indicator dates from 1993 for Côte d'Ivoire, from 1999 for Senegal, from 1991 for Nigeria, from 1994 for Guinea, from 1999 for Burkina Faso; for 2008, the indicator dates from 2000 for Togo, from 2002 for Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria, from 2006 for Senegal.

## Annex 2: Official list of indicators associated with the MDGs (effective from January 15, 2008)

Goals and targets (announced in the Millennium Declaration)	Indicators of progress
<b>Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</b>	
Target 1A: Reduce by half, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day	1.1 Proportion of the population with less than one dollar a day in purchasing power parity (PPP) <sup>7</sup> 1.2 Poverty gap ratio 1.3 Share of the poorest quintile in national consumption
Target 1B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people	1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed 1.5 Employment-to-population ratio 1.6 Proportion of employed people living on less than one dollar (PPP) a day 1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing family members in total employment
Target 1C: Reduce by half, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	1.8 Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age 1.9 Proportion of the population below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption
<b>Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education</b>	
Target 2A: By 2015, ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling	2.1 net enrolment rate in primary education 2.2 Proportion of schoolchildren starting the first year of school who complete primary school 2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 years-olds, women and men
<b>Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women</b>	
Target 3A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and at all levels by 2015	3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education 3.2 Proportion of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector 3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament
<b>Goal 4: Reduce the mortality of children under five years of age</b>	
Target 4A: Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five	4.1 Mortality rate of children under five years of age 4.2 Infant mortality rate 4.3 Proportion of one year-old children vaccinated against measles
<b>Goal 5: Improve maternal health</b>	
Target 5A: Reduce by three quarters between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality rate	5.1 Maternal mortality ratio 5.2 Proportion of births attended by qualified health personnel
Target 5B: Achieve by 2015, universal access to reproductive health	5.3 Contraceptive prevalence rate 5.4 Adolescent birth rate 5.5 Prenatal care coverage (at least one visit and at least four visits) 5.6 Unmet needs for family planning
<b>Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</b>	

<sup>7</sup> To monitor the evolution of poverty in the different countries, it is preferable to use indicators, if any, that are founded on national poverty levels.

Goals and targets (announced in the Millennium Declaration)	Indicators of progress
Target 6A: By 2015, halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	6.1 HIV prevalence among the population aged 15-24 years 6.2 Use of condom during last high-risk sexual relation 6.3 Proportion of the population aged 15- 24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS 6.4 Rate of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 years
Target 6B: By 2010, achieve universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it	6.5 Proportion of the population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral medications
Target 6C: By 2015, halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	6.6 Incidence and mortality rates associated with malaria 6.7 Proportion of children under five sleeping under insecticide-treated bed nets 6.8 Proportion of children under five with fever who are treated with appropriate anti-malarial medications 6.9 Incidence, prevalence and mortality rate associated with tuberculosis 6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed short-course treatment
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	
Target 7A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources	7.1 Proportion of land area covered by forests 7.2 Emissions of CO2 (total per capita and per one dollar of GDP, in purchasing power parity) 7.3 Consumption of ozone-depleting substances 7.4 Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological limits 7.5 Proportion of total water resources used
Target 7B: Reduce biodiversity loss and achieve by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss	7.6 Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas protected 7.7 Proportion of species threatened with extinction
Target 7C: Reduce by half by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation	7.8 Proportion of the population using an improved drinking water source 7.9 Proportion of the population using an improved sanitation facility
Target 7D: Achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020	7.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums <sup>8</sup>
Goal 8: Set up a global partnership for development	

8 The effective proportion of slum dwellers is obtained by calculating the number of urban population obliged to accept at least one of the following conditions : a) insufficient access to an improved water source; b) insufficient access to improved sanitation facilities; c) crowding (three people or more per room); d) dwellings made of non-sustainable materials.

Goals and targets (announced in the Millennium Declaration)	Indicators of progress
<p>Target 8A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction, both nationally and internationally</p> <p>Target 8B: Address the special needs of the least developed countries Includes tariff and quota free access for the exports of the least developed countries, enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and cancellation of official bilateral debt and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction</p> <p>Target 8C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing states (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second Special Session of the General Assembly)</p> <p>Target 8D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term.</p>	<p>Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately for the least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states. Official development Assistance (ODA)</p> <p>8.1 Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries as a percentage of OECD/DAC donors' gross national income</p> <p>8.2 Proportion of total bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors by sector, to basic social services (basic education, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)</p> <p>8.3 Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is not tied</p> <p>8.4 ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of their gross national income</p> <p>8.5 ODA received in small island developing states as a proportion of their gross national incomes</p> <p>Access to markets</p> <p>8.6 Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and least developed countries, admitted free of duty</p> <p>8.7 Average tariffs imposed by developing countries on agricultural products, textiles and clothing from developing countries</p> <p>8.8 Estimated agricultural support of OECD countries as a percentage of their gross domestic product</p> <p>8.9 Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity</p> <p>Debt sustainability</p> <p>8.10 Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative)</p> <p>8.11 Debt relief committed under HIPC and MDRI Initiatives</p> <p>8.12 Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services</p>
<p>Target 8E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential medications in developing countries</p>	<p>8.13 Proportion of the population with access to affordable essential medications on a sustainable basis</p>
<p>Target 8F: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications, for all</p>	<p>8.14 Number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants</p> <p>8.15 Number of cell phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants</p> <p>8.16 Number of users per 100 inhabitants</p>

